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A COMPARATIVE LOOK AT TDR,
SUBDIVISION EXACTIONS, AND ZONING
AS ENVIRONMENTAL PRESERVATION
PANACEAS: THE SEARCH FOR DR.
JEKYLL WITHOUT MR. HYDE
NORMAN MARCUS*
I. INTRODUCTION
While NEPA and its progeny may have spawned a logical national
process for flagging environmental impacts before major land use de-
cisions affecting the environment are made, no comparable coordi-
nated program for environmental preservation of privately-owned
natural areas (of quality) emerged in the 1970's. Discrete pieces of
federal and state legislation concerning coastal zone management,'
open space,2 flood insurance,3 clean air,4 and water quality control'
* Counsel, New York City Planning Commission, Adjunct Professor, New York
University Law School. and Pratt Institute; B.A., Columbia College, 1953; LL.B.,
Yale University Law School, 1957.
The author is deeply indebted to Elizabeth Friedgut, J.D., Washington University
School of Law, 1980, for her creative legal participation in the preparation of this
article.
1. Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1464 (1976 & Supp.
III 1979).
2 Provision is made for federal grants for open space acquisition at 16 U.S.C.
§ 4601-8(e) (1976).
3. National Flood Insurance Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4001-4128 (1976 & Supp.
III 1979).
4. Clear Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (Supp. III 1979).
5. Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
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emerged during this period. This legislation was accompanied on the
local level by a mixed bag of regulatory techniques including special
district zoning,6 transferable development rights (TDR),7 and subdi-
vision exactions,8 which, along with renascent legal propositions such
as the public trust doctrine9 and the law of custom,10 provided tools
of varying quality to achieve the environmental preservation goal.
This article will examine these tools with regard to their effectiveness
in promoting environmental preservation as well as their adverse im-
pacts on other local community goals.
In the search for the best way to secure environmental preservation
short of paying for it through the exercise of eminent domain, each of
the techniques, when examined critically, displays a dismaying Ja-
nus-like tendency to cause or exacerbate other problems within the
affected community. This article will explore the propensity of TDR
to create or magnify density problems in terms of both building bulk
and population. The article will also note the tendency of subdivi-
sion exactions to exclude potential community newcomers and will
question whether even sensitive zoning controls within the natural
zone can prevent unacceptable development pressures on an all-too-
yielding environment.
By recognizing and grappling with the Hyde-like propensities la-
tent in some of our principal regulatory tools, we can minimize the
unanticipated consequences of enthusiastic but uncritical pursuit of
an environmental chimera. We can also choose the regulation which
makes the most sense for our particular area of concern.
Traditionally, Americans have believed that ownership of a fee
simple interest in real property confers upon its owner the right to do
whatever he wants with his land, subject only to minimal government
6. See generally THE NEW ZONING: LEGAL, ADMINISTRATIVE, AND ECONOMIC
CONCEPTS AND TECHNIQUES (N. Marcus & M. Groves eds. 1970).
7. See generally Costonis, Development Rights Transfer: An Exploratory Essay, 83
YALE L.J. 75 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Costonis, Development Rights Transfer].
8. See generally Heyman & Gilhool, The Constitutionality of Imposing Increased
Community Costs on New Subdivision Residents through Subdivision Exactions, 73
YALE L.J. 1119 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Heyman & Gilhool].
9. See generally Berland, Toward the True Meaning of the Public Trust, I SEA
GRANT J. 83 (1976). See also notes 142-73 and accompanying text infra.
10. W. BURBY, REAL PROPERTY § 115 (3rd ed. 1965) [hereinafter cited as BURBY].
See also State ex rel Thornton v. Hay, 254 Or. 584, 462 P.2d 671 (1969).
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regulations."' Although land previously seemed to be "an unlimited
commodity,"' 12 sprawl has forced local governments to re-examine
their land use policies and take strong measures to curb what has
been described as "the appallingly rapid disappearance of open
space" in this country. 3
Government regulation in this area has increased the involvement
of municipalities in the private real estate market and reflects the
growing realization that zoning alone may be insufficient to deal with
the complex needs of today's expanding suburban communities.
The basic argument is that zoning policies function as a head tax
on new entrants, but that the tax may be too high in that it goes
beyond reducing the congestion costs of new development and
reduces the amount of developable land below that amount de-
manded by the market. The result is. . .an inefficient resource
allocation because too much land is left undisturbed.' 4
Conventional zoning is particularly ineffective when applied to the
problem of how best to protect an area's open space and environmen-
tal resources. It can do little more than "provide for the harmonious
and efficient development of all the land." 5 According to traditional
Euclidean 6 zoning theory, a municipality is divided into several uni-
form use districts within which certain kinds of incompatible devel-
opment are prohibited. This system achieves no positive benefits
extending beyond the development site.
When faced with the problem of how best to protect environmen-
tally sensitive lands, local governments have traditionally had two
options. They could "downzone" entire zoning districts containing
valuable open space, or they could acquire the property in question
for public park use through an exercise of their eminent domain pow-
ers.' 7 Downzoning is an attempt by a municipality to mitigate the
11. Chavooshian, Norman & Nieswand, Transfer of Development Rights: New
Concept in Land Use Management, in THE TRANSFER OF DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS 165,
166 (J. Rose ed. 1975) [hereinafter cited as Chavooshian].
12. Id
13. Associated Home Builders v. City of Walnut Creek, 4 Cal. 3d 633, 638, 484
P.2d 606, 610, 94 Cal. Rptr. 630, 634 (1971), appeal dismissed, 404 U.S. 878 (1971).
14, Tarlock, TDR and Natural Resources Law: Comparison and Contrast 10
(May 3, 1979) (paper prepared for presentation at the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy
Seminar on TDR).
15. Chavooshian, supra note 11, at 167.
16. See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
17. U.S. CONST. amend. V, applied to the states by U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
1980]
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impact of development activity on the surrounding area by the enact-
ment of an ordinance which either increases the minimum lot size for
new unit construction' 8 or otherwise decreases the dwelling unit yield
on an acreage basis. Courts have closely scrutinized the validity of
downzoning schemes utilizing theories ranging from Fourteenth
Amendment confiscation to minority group exclusion on state or fed-
eral constitutional grounds.'9 As for the direct taking alternative, it is
clear that the fiscal crisis which most municipalities face today as well
as citizen movements to adopt resolutions like Proposition 13 are
likely to discourage effective utilization of eminent domain on any
wide-scale basis to protect environmentally sensitive lands.20
Consequently, there is a pressing need for sound legal devices to
18. See generally D. MANDELKER & R. CUNNINGHAM, PLANNING AND CONTROL
OF LAND DEVELOPMENT 445-48 (1979) [hereinafter cited as MANDELKER & CUN-
NINGHAM]. The United States Supreme Court recently upheld the downzoning of an
area with outstanding views of the San Francisco Bay in Agins v. City of Tiburon, 100
S. Ct. 2138 (1980). This case will be examined in some detail in connection with the
natural area zoning alternative. See notes 107-09, 338-49 and accompanying text in-
fra.
19. Chavooshian, supra note 11, at 167. See, e.g., Kavanewsky v. Zoning Bd. of
Appeals, 160 Conn. 397, 279 A.2d 567 (1971) (exclusionary motives are invalid zoning
purposes); Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison, 72 N.J. 481, 371 A.2d
1192 (1977) (large-lot zoning scheme invalid as exclusionary since municipality was
not providing its fair share of region's low-income housing needs); Southern Burling-
ton County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713, appeal
dismissed and cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975) (large-lot zoning scheme invalid); Na-
tional Land and Inv. Co. v. Kohn, 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965) (locality's desire
to preserve existing character of community not a valid legislative purpose). But see
Chucta v. Planning and Zoning Comm'n, 154 Conn. 393, 225 A.2d 822 (1967)
(downzoning necessary to provide open space for schools and adequate land for
proper water supply and sewage disposal); Norbeck Village Joint Venture v. Mont-
gomery County Council, 254 Md. 59, 254 A.2d 700 (1969) (downzoning to establish
greenbelt as part of countywide comprehensive plan is legitimate exercise of munici-
pal police power).
20. The problems involved in using the power of eminent domain today have
been identified as follows:
1) lack of funds for this purpose. Voter reluctance to approve programs or bond
issues that will result in increased taxation is a serious obstacle . . . ; 2) when
title is transferred from private to public ownership, the property is removed
from the tax rolls and the remaining property owners in the jurisdiction must
bear a proportionately larger share of the burden; 3) many. . . landowners are
unwilling to relinquish possession of their land even for a fair consideration; 4)
• . . the high costs of land acquisition . . . divert substantial public resources
from other objectives of higher priority, such as education and housing.
Rose, A Proposal for the Separation and Marketability of Development Rights as a
Technique to Preserve Open Space, 51 J. URB. L. 461, 465 (1974).
[Vol, 20:3
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protect natural resources. It has become increasingly apparent that
traditional land use techniques may not provide municipalities with
legally sufficient controls over development to ensure the protection
necessary for their precious environmental resources. In recent years,
local governments have experimented with the use of transfer of de-
velopment rights, subdivision exactions, and special zoning districts
as means of coping with this environmental imperative. These de-
vices-their promise and their problems-will be the subject of this
inquiry.
II. SOME REGULATORY ALTERNATIVES TO PUBLIC FUNDING
Let us imagine the following hypothetical. A large lakefront area,
twenty miles from the nearest incorporated hamlet but within its ter-
ritorial jurisdiction, exists in relatively pristine treed condition, free
from development except for a few scattered secluded summer cot-
tages set back a minimum of 200 feet from the shoreline. The town
may acquire a major research and development plant with its ex-
pected complement of workers. Land all the way to the lakefront is
being optioned; developers are making inquiries regarding possible
subdivisions; and local officials are weighing various regulatory op-
tions to insure that change, when it comes, respects the town's basic
goals. These goals include prohibition of building within 200 feet of
the lakefront shoreline; retention of the existing small-town character
which is presently retained by permitting densities not exceeding one
dwelling unit per acre; and preservation of natural features such as
unique topography, boulders, flora and fauna to the maximum extent
consistent with its low-population density and small town character.
The municipality, already familiar with traditional Euclidean zon-
ing, wishes to consider application of newer regulatory techniques to
achieve its ends, such as transferable development rights (TDR), en-
vironmental subdivision exactions, and natural area zoning, as well
as to protect its land through the latest extensions of the public trust
doctrine and the law of custom.
A. Transferable Development Rights (TDR)
The suggested TDR solution to preserving the 200-foot lakefront
strip requires that a municipality first recognize development rights
therein on the pre-existing minimum one acre lot basis. The munici-
pality could then sever and transfer these development rights to the
balance of the vacant upland extending to the present urbanized area,
1980]
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mandating preservation 2 of the area from whence the development
rights originated. Such TDR could be made conditional on cluster-
ing or planned unit development, including multiple dwellings, or
could be granted as of right in the form of additional units on smaller
lots.
The idea for TDR in suburban or rural settings arose from the
same theory as lay behind planned unit developments22 (PUDs) and
cluster zoning.23 PUDs and clusters require that the open space area
and the development be on the same or adjoining parcels24 and that
the entire parcel be in common ownership. TDR plans, on the other
hand, may provide for a municipality to designate large areas of open
space a considerable distance from the area where TDRs may actu-
ally be received and put to use. The severance and sale of these de-
velopment rights is intended to mitigate adverse effects on property
owners from the loss or reduction of their right to develop their land
located within the preservation zone. The areas thus preserved need
21. Such preservation could be achieved either through restricted open use zoning
classification (recreation, agriculture), where such classification constitutes a reason-
able beneficial use, or through application of the public trust doctrine or law of cus-
tom. See notes 125-73 and accompanying text infra.
22. "A Planned Unit Development (PUD) is a residential development in which
prevailing density regulations apply to the project as a whole rather than to its indi-
vidual lots. Densities are calculated on a project-wide basis, permitting, among other
things, the clustering of houses and provision of common open space." P. ROHAN,
ZONING AND LAND USE CONTROLS § 1.02(2)(c) n.19 (1978) [hereinafter cited as
ROHAN].
23. "Cluster zoning is a device or technique for the grouping of residences to in-
crease dwelling densities on specific locations of development area in order to provide
open space elsewhere." Id § 1.03(2)(b)(ii). To assure this result, "[pirovision is made
in the zoning ordinance, or in the subdivision regulations, for the development of
tracts of land in compliance with overall density limitations but without regard to
specific yard, lot coverage, area or frontage requirements." R. ANDERSON, AMERI-
CAN LAW OF ZONING § 8.17 (1968).
24. Carlo & Wright, Transfer o/Development Rights: A Remedyfor Prior Exces-
sive Subdivision, 10 U.C.D. L. REV. 1, 3 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Carlo & Wright].
The use of PUDs and cluster zoning techniques, however, will not sufficiently restrict
development to preserve natural resources. This is because:
these devices are generally applied to small areas and are usually an option to the
existing lot-by-lot subdivision process . . . [T]he best [that can] be achieved is
some minimal break in an otherwise monotonous development. Haphazard,
noncontiguous, scattered open space generally is the result. This. . . does not
protect the large areas of open space, such as farmlands, steep and wooded
slopes, and aquifer recharge areas, that are necessary if the water and air supply
is to be free from serious pollution as the population increases.
Chavooshian, supra note 11, at 168.
(Vol. 20:3
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not adjoin the development area25 to which the rights ultimately at-
tach. The author will question the assumption underlying this "Miti-
gation" proposition, particularly where rosy real estate development
expectations are belied by the heretofore exclusively natural qualities
of the area, such as shorefront, steep slope, and thick forest undis-
turbed since Indian times.
The principle underlying TDR is that the development potential of
privately owned land represents "a community asset that government
may allocate to enhance the general welfare."26 TDR is meant to
protect public resources through the redistribution of zoning densities
to areas in the community where development will pose no environ-
mental threat and the infrastructure will support the additional densi-
ties. The assumption is that TDR can increase predictability in
planning, since the environmental designation of lands within the
preservation zones will give more definition to the municipality's
comprehensive plan. This may enable local governments to exercise
greater control over population influx and its relation to the provision
of capital improvements, and to otherwise provide for the well-
ordered growth of their areas.27
The chance for success of any TDR scheme is at its inception ques-
tionable. Its effectiveness depends on the creation and maintenance
of a market for development which may or may not occur given the
vicissitudes of today's real estate market.28 To the extent that the
implementation of such a program requires the establishment of ge-
neric uniform districts, including a preservation zone generating
transferable development rights and a district to receive the gener-
ated development rights, an argument can be made that the limits of
TDR are the limits of traditional zoning.29 Thus, concepts familiar
25. Carlo & Wright, supra note 24, at 3.
26. Schnidman, Transferable Detelopment Rights (TDR), in WINDFALLS FOR
WIPEOuTS 532 (D. Hagman & D. Misczynski eds. 1978).
27. Chavooshian, supra note 11, at 175. Overt control of population influx has
been challenged as a violation of the constitutional freedom to travel protected under
the First Amendment. Federal courts have skirted this challenge largely due to lack
of standing, giving effect to population-curbing regulation based on a quality of life
rationale. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975); Construction Indus. Ass'n v. City
of Petaluma, 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 934 (1976). See also
cases cited in note 19 supra.
28. Shlaes, Who Pays for Transfer of Development Rights? 40 PLANNING 7, 8
(July, 1974), reprinted in THE TRANSFER OF DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS 330, 331 (J. Rose
ed. 1975) [hereinafter cited as Shlaes].
29. Elliott & Marcus, From Euclid to Ramapo: New Directions in Land Develop-
1980]
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to Euclidean enthusiasts, such as zoning in accordance with "a well-
considered plan"30 and "spot zoning,"'' are apt to see increasing use
as springboards to challenge far-flying TDR shifts lacking any ra-
tional planning nexus.32
Whether the use of TDR will in fact protect environmentally sensi-
tive lands will depend on the type of area in which the system is
applied. For example, the use of TDR in the commercial center of a
major urban area like New York City can provide property owners
with some assurance that their development rights will be purchased
at a price approximating their market value.33
Such is not the case, however, in many suburban and rural areas
where there may be no demand to build at increased densities, a de-
mand which must be at the heart of any TDR program which is to be
ment Controls, 1 HOFSTRA L. REV. 56, 72 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Elliott & Mar-
cus].
30. N.Y. GEN. CITY LAW § 20.25(a) (McKinney 1977). See also Haar, In Accord-
ance with a Comprehensive Plan, 68 HARV. L. REV. 1154 (1955) [hereinafter cited as
Haar].
31. Spot zoning has been described as the alteration of the existing character of an
area in favor of a particular class of property owners, to the detriment of the general
community. Udell v. Haas, 21 N.Y.2d 463, 235 N.E.2d 897, 288 N.Y.S.2d 993 (1968).
32. See generally Elliott & Marcus, supra note 29, at 56; Marcus, VillardPreservd:
Or, Zoning for Landmarks in the Central Business District, 44 BROOKLYN L. REv. 1
(1977); Marcus, Mandatory Development Rights Transfer and the Taking Clause.- The
Case of Manhattan's Tudor City Parks, 24 BUFFALO L. REV. 77 (1974) [hereinafter
cited as Marcus, Mandatory TDR].
33. This is because the demand to build at increased densities is so great in large
urban areas that development rights owners, in effect, occupy a "monopolistic posi-
tion" in the market that gives them more assurance that their rights will be purchased
at a fair price. See also Marcus, New York City: The Development Rights Transfer
Story 23 (May 3, 1979) (paper prepared for presentation at the Lincoln Institute of
Land Policy Seminar on TDR) [hereinafter cited as Marcus, New York City]. The
United States Supreme Court recognized the value of transferable development rights
in midtown Manhattan in Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104
(1978), rehearing denied, 439 U.S. 883 (1978). But see Fred F. French Inv. Co. v. City
of New York, 39 N.Y.2d 587, 350 N.E.2d 381, 385 N.Y.S.2d 5 (1976), appeal dis-
missed, 429 U.S. 990 (1976), wherein the New York Court of Appeals invalidated a
1972 amendment to the New York City Zoning Resolution which created a "Special
Park District" and provided for the transfer of development rights from two private
parks rezoned for preservation as passive recreation areas. In so doing, the Court
reasoned that in the absence of a reasonable beneficial use, the development rights
were too speculative to be considered as a measurable property right since their sale
was made dependent on "an unpredictable real estate market" and "the contingent
future approvals of administrative agencies, events which may never happen because
of the exigencies of the market and the contingencies and exigencies of administrative
action." Id at 598, 350 N.E.2d at 388, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 11-12.
[Vol, 20:3
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taken seriously. Where such demand does exist, the increased densi-
ties generated by TDR may pose a threat to suburban or rural char-
acter far surpassing any threatened loss of an ecological treasure.
This threat takes the form of squeezing additional units of develop-
ment onto the receiving lot in the transfer zone. For example, in our
hypothetical development district, the minimum one-acre zoning lot
control would, with the purchase of TDR, support two units of hous-
ing instead of one. From a community planning perspective, such
doubling of density may pose undesirable aesthetic and infrastruc-
ture burdens. Municipalities may prefer to institute an expanded ver-
sion of subdivision land dedication and fee exaction requirements or
a variation of New York City's Special Natural Area Zoning District
in order to protect their communities' environmental resources.
1. The Marketplace Predicate for TDR
No TDR scheme will work without assurance that sale of develop-
ment rights will be profitable.34 The availability of buyers for the
rights "will vary among different communities as well as over time
and will depend upon the size and character of the transfer zone, the
rigidity of its zoning, and the demand for new development within its
boundaries."35 Consequently, before any municipality decides to im-
plement a TDR program within its jurisdiction, it should carefully
analyze the local economic climate.
In doing so, a municipality's first concern should be whether an
appropriate area exists to which it may safely transfer development
rights. These transfer districts must be "areas suitable for more in-
tense development based on planning theory, (and must have) avail-
able public facilities and utilities, and overall compatibility with both
the built and natural environment."36 The municipality generates
demand for the right to build in the transfer district by permitting
development at a higher density than is otherwise allowable under
the existing zoning resolution,37 provided that the prospective
34. See Shlaes, supra note 28, at 8, THE TRANSFER OF DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS, at
333.
35. Id
36. Schnidman, Transferable Development Rights (TDR), in WINDFALLS FOR
WIPEOUTS 532 (D. Hagman & D. Misczynski eds. 1978).
37. The total permitted increased [sic] in density in the district will depend on
the number of outstanding development rights issued as a result of the designa-
tion of the preserved district.
1980]
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developer first purchases development rights from an owner of prop-
erty located within the preservation zone.38
The municipality must not draw the transfer districts too narrowly,
or there will be an insufficient number of sites to which the develop-
ment rights may be transferred.39 Transfer districts must be large
enough not only to assure preservation landowners that there will be
a market for their development rights, but also to provide for the
well-ordered distribution of the additional densities throughout the
area.
The delicacy of the situation requires the implementation of a very
flexible municipal zoning scheme that will allow transfer of develop-
ment rights to lots which are not necessarily located adjacent to the
preservation zone.' The experience of the New York City Planning
Commission in this regard may prove instructive. In considering
Moreover, whatever new density requirements are established in whatever lo-
cation, the overall result must be a new zoning district where it is more desirable
to build with development rights. . . . In short, the new densities permitted
must [themselves] create the incentive.
Chavooshian, supra note 11, at 173.
A TDR transfer district may appear to resemble a Special Development Zoning
District which has traditionally provided for the manipulation of zoning lot densities
through the provision of a floor area ratio (FAR) bonus. This technique enables a
developer to exceed the maximum floor area allowable in relation to overall lot size
permitted under the zoning ordinance in return for the provision of certain improve-
ments. Through the FAR bonus, a city exercises its police power to artificially restrict
development "and then prescribes conditions under which these restrictions may be
relaxed." The TDR system, on the other hand, singles out the right to develop from
the other rights of ownership and manipulates it to control land use, thereby creating
possible equal protection problems. Rose, supra note 20, at 475.
38. The impetus to apply for permission to build at an increased density may also
be created by the downzoning of the entire transfer district. The political opposition
that such an approach is likely to engender in the community would probably pre-
clude its adoption. See Gans, Saving Valued Spaces and Places Through Development
Rights Transfer, in THE TRANSFER OF DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS 275, 278 (J. Rose ed.
1975) [hereinafter cited as Gans].
39. Marcus, New York City, supra note 33, at 22.
40. The designation of non-adjacent transfer districts must be grounded in the
new approach to zoning exemplified by PUDs and Special Purpose District regula-
tions. Otherwise, TDR to noncontiguous lots could be regarded as "contrary to the
prevailing notions about the need for uniformity of controls in a given area" on the
grounds that "the essential interrelationship of zoning density controls to street width,
transit access, school seats and other objects of planning concern could not survive the
indiscriminate transferability of unused development rights between widely spaced
parcels." Elliott & Marcus, supra note 29, at 72.
[Vol. 20:3
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whether TDR could be used to protect the unique natural areas of
Staten Island and the Riverdale section of the Bronx, this author
noted that "locations near these large natural areas were zoned for
single-family residences on relatively large lots. There was no market
for TDRs in these sylvan retreats, whose character would have been
utterly destroyed by higher densities."'" Hence any successful utili-
zation of TDR from these areas would have necessitated the designa-
tion of more distant transfer districts.42
In order to protect the interests of property owners in existing
neighborhoods, a municipality may have to establish a transfer dis-
trict sufficiently removed from the preservation zone. In this way, the
increased densities to which the receiving lots will be subject will not
unduly affect either the environmental preserve or the surrounding
suburban character. In addition to the administrative difficulties and
tax consequences involved, 43 however, any local government seeking
to implement TDR in this manner would probably have to defend its
scheme against the claim that establishing non-contiguous transfer
districts will have arbitrary and therefore impermissible planning
consequences. Opponents would argue that these transfer districts
bear no reasonable relationship to the benefits accruing from the
preservation of the natural areas, and that any such crosstown trans-
fers are spot zoning deviations" from the municipality's comprehen-
sive plan.
Another problem with using TDR to protect environmental re-
sources in suburban areas is the way in which development rights are
measured for each property owner in the preservation zone. The
usual measurement is in terms of number of residential units per
acre.41 Purported advantages of this system are administrative sim-
plicity and equalization of development costs and benefits arising
from regulation rather than from inherent land characteristics. 46 The
41. Marcus, New York City, supra note 33, at 22.
42. This approach proved infeasible and the plan was ultimately rejected. Id
43. See notes 59-67 and accompanying text infra.
44. Marcus, Mandatory TDR, supra note 32, at 109.
45. DeVoy, Transfer of Development Rights-A Critique of Present Experience
and Proposals for Marketable Transfer Rights 5 (May 3, 1979) (paper prepared for
presentation at the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy Seminar on TDR) [hereinafter
cited as DeVoy].
46. Lynch, Controlling the Location and Timing of Development by the Distribution
of Marketable Development Rights, in THE TRANSFER OF DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS 259,
261 (J. Rose ed. 1975). The author also notes that "[t]he proposition might be consid-
1980]
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value of development rights, however, "can vary greatly depending
on the environment (both natural and manmade), access, and availa-
bility of public facilities and services."4 7 These factors are ultimately
accounted for in that the rights are bought and sold at the then cur-
rent market value for new units in the transfer district.
TDR is intended to mitigate what has been christened the "wind-
falls and wipeouts" phenomenon in land use planning. 8 According
to this theory, whenever government regulation restricts the right to
develop certain properties, thereby "wiping out" an important ele-
ment of value of the lands in question, other properties in the com-
munity increase in value in proportion to the loss of "building
increment"49 from the regulated areas and receive a "windfall" in the
process. In our TDR example, landowners are "wiped out" by the
designation of their property for special preservation treatment, while
transfer district property owners receive a "windfall" from their en-
hanced location, where proximate to the preserved natural resources.
The sale of development rights by the preservation property owners
is intended to mitigate the windfalls and wipeouts engendered under
such a TDR scheme by forcing developers to pay for the rights to
build at additional densities.5 ° That payment, depending on the mu-
ered an unfair redistribution of land values, since owners of inaccessible or unusable
land get as many rights as the owners of ripe land. But the owner of unusual land is
still unable to market it and this may be reinforced by the enactment of 'non-develop-
ment' zones." Id at 263. In this way, TDR is intended to protect preservation prop-
erty owners from arbitrary planning results on the rationale that they are receiving an
"average reciprocity of advantage." See Marcus, The Grand Slam Grand Central Ter-
minal Decision .4 Euclidfor Landmarks, Favorable Noticefor TDR and a Resolution
of the Regulatory/Taking Impasse, 7 ECOLOGY L.Q. 731, 744 (1979). The doctrine of
"average reciprocity of advantage" was elucidated by Justice Holmes in Pennsylvania
Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). Query whether any "uniformity"
achieved through such indiscriminate blanketing of TDR privileges is not essentially
spurious.
47. DeVoy, supra note 45, at 5.
48. See generally WINDFALLS FOR WIPEOUTS (D. Hagman & D. Misczynski eds.
1978).
49. Turvey, Development Charges and the Compensation-Betterment Problem, 63
ECON. J. 299, 300 (1953), cited in Costonis, Development Rights Transfer, supra note 7,
at 83.
50. Costonis, Development Rights Transfer, supra note 7, at 99. In this way, TDR
"closes the externality loop by charging the land development process with costs that
formerly, and improperly, fell upon the community in the form of environmental
degradation-or of expensive remedial programs to overcome it." Id at 100.
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nicipal process, is made directly or indirectly to the owner of environ-
mentally sensitive land.
Some windfalls and wipeouts persist, however, even under this
TDR arrangement. There is no assurance that the sale price of the
development rights will adequately reflect their ultimate value to
transfer district property owners who will use them presumably to
build more profitable structures than are available to non-participat-
ing landowners in the area." Furthermore, if, as will not be uncom-
mon, the transfer district is designated in an area at some distance
from the preservation zone, the property owners in the distant dis-
trict, although not benefitted by proximity to the preserved natural
area, will still have to purchase development rights if they wish to
build at the greater densities.52 At the same time, landowners adja-
cent to the preservation zone receive all of the benefits, indeed a
windfall, from proximity to the natural resources, while paying none
of the costs involved.
The preservation property owners' receipt of a fair price for devel-
opment rights depends on "their perception of the density restrictions
within the transfer area and the value to developers from the relaxa-
tion of these restrictions."53 Proposals for giving greater certainty
and definition to preservation owners' development rights include:
"[Tiranslate the physical units of [development] into their dollar
value so as to better assimilate the financial yield that the rights will
.. . generate from their attachment to transfer sites;"54 require local
51. Gale, The Transfer of Development Rights: Some Equity Considerations, 14
URBAN L. ANN. 81, 84 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Gale].
52 Id at 86.
53. Field & Conrad, Economic Issues in Programs of Transferable Development
Rights, 51 LAND ECON. 331, 332 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Field & Conrad].
54, DeVoy, supra note 45, at 5. One variant of this approach has been proposed
for Vermont. Wilson, A Land Use Control System Based on Transferable Develop-
ment Rights 1-7 (1974) (unpublished paper for Vermont Natural Resources Council).
Under this approach,
a local government would conduct an appraisal of each property in the jurisdic-
tion, establishing both its current use and market values. Development rights
would be apportioned to each property owner as a function of the differences in
these values. The sum of the differences for all eligible properties in the jurisdic-
tion would constitute the dollar value of the maximum permissible volume of
development .... In order to develop his land to the maximum allowable ex-
tent, the owner would have to purchase development rights equivalent to the
anticipated value of the new use, established by an up-to-date appraisal. If a
developer wanted to build on a newly-acquired property, it would be necessary
for him to obtain rights equivalent to the difference between the appraised pres-
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governments to issue development rights at a uniform price and al-
low sale prices in the transfer area to bear any "difference due to
amenity and location," thereby minimizing the loss in tax revenue
that the municipality would otherwise have to tolerate upon the reas-
sessment of the preservation property;55 and provide for the estab-
lishment of a development rights bank run by the municipality that
would compensate the landowner in cash for the taking of his devel-
opment potential and would place the burden on the city for regain-
ing the preservation program's cost through direct sale of
development rights to developers. 6
The purpose behind these proposals is to minimize the speculative
activity otherwise generated by TDR through the implementation of
a system that cushions impacts on the preservation properties and
hopefully better reflects the market realities and planning considera-
tions involved in the use of TDR. This proposed cure is perhaps
worse than the disease. Municipal investment in a development
rights bank would provide a fascinating case study of Jekyll and
Hyde schizophrenia: conflicting pressures to sell the rights and
recoup municipal investment versus community pressures to limit the
extent and location of the additional transferable densities. Another
problem with this approach is that landowners may lack confidence
in a local government's ability to regulate the price of development
ent use value and the sale price (less any development rights already attached to
the property at purchase). After a specified period of time, development rights
prices would be established on the open market, rather than through appraisal.
Gale, supra note 51, at 84-85 (footnotes omitted).
55. Gans, supra note 38, at 277.
56. Note, T7he Unconstitutionality of Transferable Development Rights, 84 YALE
L.J. 1101, 1113 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Unconstitutionality]. The problems with
the approach are the same as those facing municipalities in the exercise of their emi-
nent domain powers, ie., the lack of adequate funds to purchase the development
rights. For an ingenious way out of this problem, see Costonis, The Chicago Plan:
Incentive Zoning and the Preservation of Urban Landmarks, 85 HARV. L. REV. 574
(1972), reprinted in THE TRANSFER OF DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS 300 (J. Rose ed. 1975)
[hereinafter cited as Costonis, he Chicago Plan]. Nor does it appear likely that a
local government will be able to recoup some of its losses by the taxation of develop-
ment rights before they are purchased by property owners in the transfer district. The
rights cannot be taxed as real property without attachment to a particular plot of land.
See 56 A.L.R. 3d 1300 (1974). Whether they can be taxed as personalty will depend
on the law of the jurisdiction in which the TDR scheme is being implemented.
Should any municipality be bold enough to try this scheme it would soon face the
dilemma of trying to regulate in accordance with a well-considered plan while trying
to peddle the purchased development rights in the most marketable location.
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rights.57 If recourse to public investment for environmental preserva-
tion is in the cards, use of straightforward eminent domain programs
for these purposes would seem preferable to municipal TDR bank
Ponzi schemes.58
For the reasons given above, most municipalities have chosen to
permit the free market, within limits set by the existing zoning resolu-
tion and current economic theory, to determine the price and specific
placement of development rights within their jurisdiction. This es-
sentially laissezfaire TDR approach, within broad guidelines set out
in the definition of preservation and transfer areas, has resulted in ad
hoe decision-making and a great deal of market uncertainty in the
sale of development rights. Preservation property owners have often
refused to sell at the price offered, on the grounds that the offer does
not adequately reflect the loss of their development potential, or have
quoted figures unreasonably high for area developers.59 Undoubt-
edly, some of thse problems are due simply to ignorance of the pur-
poses and intended effects of TDR. Nonetheless, failure to trade in
development rights, for whatever reason, also diminishes the demand
for them in the transfer district, thereby causing preservation prop-
erty owners financial uncertainty in the marketing of their develop-
ment rights.' No wonder, then, that the courts have been reluctant
to find that TDR provisions can assure preservation landowners a
"reasonable return" on their property.6'
57. Gans, supra note 38, at 277. According to one real estate economist, the pri-
vate real estate industry believes that local governments adopt TDR price-fixing plans
on:
the assumption that developers' profits are excessive and that these profits can be
reduced without lowering the developers' incentive or increasing the cost of the
product. Patent nonsense. Most major real estate developers have a goal of a
15% rate of return on invested capital--and frequently this is not achieved. In
fact, the average is much less, despite the high risk.
DeVoy, upra note 45, at 3.
58. The reference here is to Charles Ponzi, an international real estate financier of
the earlier twentieth century. Ponzi is particularly noted for his get rich quick
schemes which brought him to the very pinnacle of financial success, but led shortly
thereafter to his ruin and deportation from the United States in 1934. For further
insights into the life of this elegant promoter-swindler, see Maloney, The Rise of Mr.
Ponzi, NEw YORKER, May 5, 1937, at 20.
59. Gans, supra note 38, at 277.
60. Chavooshian, supra note 11, at 172. It can also result in a long-term loss in
general tax revenues which most municipalities can ill-afford. See notes 62-67 and
accompanying text infra.
61. See, e.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978);
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The marketplace predicate for TDR from environmental preserves
is thus rendered uncertain by the community's comprehensive plan as
exemplified in its zoning restrictions. To the extent this framework
can be bent to render TDR a more marketable commodity, the more
likely it is to gain credibility as an environmental preservation device.
The foregoing discussion, however, makes clear the negative conse-
quences which follow any such bending of the planning framework.
2. Local Tax Consequences of TDR
Municipal planning boards around the country are currently at-
tempting to find solutions to problems created by the harsh fiscal re-
alities of the day. Among such problems is the need to keep taxes at
the minimum necessary to ensure orderly community development
and adequate maintenance of both public facilities and the existing
infrastructure system. Above all, the situation calls for the preserva-
tion and, if possible, the enhancement of municipal revenues so as to
better enable a local government to plan for the future of its citizenry.
In light of these fiscal imperatives, as well as the unanswered ques-
tions raised by TDR,62 it cannot be said that TDR provides a fiscally
responsible means by which a municipality can protect its open space
and important natural resources. The use of TDR can result in the
loss of valuable tax revenue to a city upon the designation of unde-
veloped lands, previously assessed for purposes of ad valorem taxa-
tion at a very high speculative rate, within the environmental
preservation zone.
Fred F. French Inv. Co. v. City of New York, 39 N.Y.2d 587, 598, 350 N.E.2d 381,
388, 385 N.Y.S.2d 5, 12 (1976). The situation has been described by one commentator
as follows:
The most obvious problem is that [such] market-denying allocation zoning gen-
erally lowers the return on investment, for the permitted use is likely to be less
intensive than that demanded by the market .... Market-buying allocations
often raise classic substantive due process problems and the erratic nature of the
allocation causes those who lose in the zoning game ... to cast their objections
to the windfall and wipeout allocation produced as a denial of equal protection
of the laws. The confusion over the proper purpose of zoning aggravates the
constitutional problems, for many contemporary exercises of the zoning power
are difficult to justify within the framework of traditional excuses for state in-
fringement of private initiative.
Tarlock, TDR and Natural Resources Law: Comparison and Contrast 1 (May 3,
1979) (paper prepared for presentation at the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy Semi-
nar on TDR).
62. See notes 28-61 and accompanying text supra.
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The experience of Collier County, Florida, is a case in point. Col-
lier County's reassessment of Special Treatment (preservation zone)
lands reduced their taxable value by about $45,000,000 and cost the
county $641,000 in taxes annually.63 Collier County's Planning
Commission was able to justify this loss of tax revenue and subse-
quent curtailment of public services on the grounds that the county
would not only recoup this initial loss of revenue at a later date, but
might well improve its tax base through the development of the trans-
fer district at increased permissible densities.' 4 Whether future de-
velopment could restore the loss of tax revenue to a city or county,
however, seems pure speculation. Crediting long-range tax recovery
to the introduction of a TDR scheme seems equally arbitrary, since
the success of such a program depends so much on what has always
been regarded as the basically unpredictable real estate market.
It is clear that no area--even Collier County-can stand to lose
substantial tax revenue, even for a relatively short period of time.
Additional densities in the transfer district would increase demand
for public services, requiring added municipal revenues. Tax base
erosion at such a time could well undermine provision of adequate
improvements and services by the municipality. Without the assur-
ance of sufficient revenues to provide these improvements, there will
be no community demand to maintain a market for development
rights since no development will be permitted in an area lacking ade-
quate infrastructure.65
One possible solution to this dilemma, at least in suburbia, may be
found through the making of inter-jurisdictional agreements between
tax districts. Such an agreement would "balance the revenue loss in
the preservation area jurisdiction against the tax benefits received by
the jurisdiction containing the development parcels."66 A municipal-
ity might also prevent revenue loss by designating development and
preservation areas within the same tax district.67 The political and
63. Spagna, Transferable Development Rights: Implementing the Idea 23-24
(May 3, 1979) (paper prepared for presentation at the Lincoln Institute on Land Pol-
icy Seminar on TDR) [hereinafter cited as Spagna].
64. Id
65. Harwell, Growth Management Results-The Effects of Growth Management Ac-
lions on Six Communities, ENVT'L COM. 9, 11 (June 1979). See also Golden v. Plan-
nmg Bd., 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138 (1972), appeal dismissed,
409 U.S. 1003 (1974).
66. Carlo & Wright, supra note 24, at 26.
67. Id.
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administrative difficulties involved in restructuring the tax system in
a given area, however, may well preclude the adoption of such meas-
ures.
B. Subdivision Exactions
The suggested subdivision exaction solution to preserving the 200-
foot lakefront strip in our hypothetical would be, first, to prohibit
erection of major structures thereon through limited use zoning, the
public trust doctrine, or the law of custom; second, to require the
dedication of designated environmental reserve land (achievable by
private acquistion and subsequent dedication) or payment of an ex-
action for environmental preservation on future subdivisions; and
third, possibly to levy special assessments on all taxpayers for acquir-
ing and maintaining, as appropriate, the precious lakefront resource
which benefits the entire municipality.
1. The Planning and Market Implications of Subdivision
Exactions
Unlike TDR, which is an optional developer response to market
demand for housing in a particular community, subdivision exactions
are mandatory requirements imposed on new development. They are
required from all developers as a condition of plat approval to ensure
that any new subdivision will minimize adverse impact on the char-
acter of the existing community.68 The market for residential devel-
opment had traditionally adjusted to the increased costs of housing
generated by such local requirements by raising purchase prices.
Consequently, at every point along the ascending economic curve,
purchasers are priced out of the market, with corresponding exclu-
sionary impacts.
Subdivision ordinances have withstood legal challenge on the the-
ory that their exactions are a valid expression of a municipality's
power to plan for the comprehensive development of the area.69 The
68. 5 WILLIAMS, AMERICAN LAND PLANNING LAW § 156.09 (1975).
69. See generally Associated Home Builders v. City of Walnut Creek, 4 Cal. 3d
633, 642-47, 484 P.2d 606, 614-17, 94 Cal. Rptr. 630, 638-40 (1971) (municipalities
have affirmative duty to provide open space); Jenad, Inc. v. Village of Scarsdale, 18
N.Y.2d 78, 82-83, 218 N.E.2d 673, 674-75, 271 N.Y.S.2d 955, 956-57 (1966) (open
space requirements are akin to other necessary public facilities, such as sewers, side-
walks, and lights); Brous v. Smith, 304 N.Y. 164, 170-71, 106 N.E.2d 503, 507 (1952)
(approval of subdivision applications is within scope of municipal police power); Jor-
dan v. Village of Menomonee Falls, 28 Wis. 2d 608, 622, 137 N.W.2d 442, 448 (1965)
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rationale usually applied to uphold the validity of these exactions is
that the costs of providing adequate municipal services to meet addi-
tional demand on existing community facilities should be borne by
future residents of the proposed subdivision.7"
Subdivision exactions are designed to help control the growth and
development of a community, a responsibility which has traditionally
been entrusted to a local planning board.7 In general, a municipal
planning board must approve any subdivision before it is built. This
power of review gives planning boards the authority to impose a gen-
eral design pattern on land within their jurisdiction. Unlike the situ-
ation created by TDR, a municipality can thus carefully direct and
control the impact of new development from the moment that a plat
application is filed until the subdivision itself is complete.72 In this
way, local governments are in a better position to effectively balance
the public interest in the preservation of natural resources with a
landowner's interest in making a "reasonable return" on his invest-
ment.
Subdivision exactions were originally utilized to finance certain
improvements, such as streets and sidewalks, within a subdivision. In
recent years, these requirements have been expanded to include the
dedication of land and/or the payment of fees to provide parks and
schools to meet the needs of a particular neighborhood73 and to alle-
viate over-crowding of existing facilities.74 The prevalence of subdi-
vision exactions as a planning tool today reflects the realization that
adequate open space is essential to the general public welfare.75 In
this regard, any attempt to implement a subdivision dedication or
exaction requirement to protect an area's environmental resources
should be based on the experience of municipalities in conditioning
(exactions are necessary given correlation between need to maintain municipal service
levels and influx of new residents into community).
70. See, e.g., Blevens v. City of Manchester, 103 N.H. 284, 288-89, 170 A.2d 121,
123-24 (1961); Jenad, Inc. v. Village of Scarsdale, 18 N.Y.2d 78, 82-83, 218 N.E.2d
673, 674-75, 271 N.Y.S.2d 955, 956-57 (1966); Jordan v. Village of Menomonee Falls,
28 Wis. 2d 608, 622, 137 N.W.2d 442, 448 (1965).
71. UNITED STATES DEP'T OF COMMERCE, A STANDARD CITY PLANNING EN-
ABLING ACT (1928).
72. See 5 N. WILLIAMS, AMERICAN LAND PLANNING LAW § 156.09 (1975).
73. See R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING 2D 23.39 to .41 (1975) [here-
inafter cited as ANDERSON 2D].
74. Heyman & Gilhool, supra note 8, at 1134.
75. See Chavooshian, supra note 11, at 175.
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plat approval on the provision of a certain amount of vacant land for
improvements designed to accommodate the needs of the new subdi-
vision and incidentally to benefit the community at large.
Local ordinances generally require that three to twelve percent of
the land proposed for development be dedicated to the municipal-
ity." The dedication amount may be based on either a fixed percent-
age of the total amount of subdivision land or a density formula
requiring a certain amount of land per dwelling unit or lot.7 The fee
exacted in lieu of land dedicated is often a per lot amount "equal to
the value of the land which could have been required, or a percentage
of the assessed value of all the land in the plat.""8
Originally, land dedications were by far the more popular planning
device, no doubt because of their derivation from earlier regulations
conditioning plat approval on the dedication of land for streets and
sidewalks. Fees were used where a particular parcel was too small
for a municipality to reasonably require the dedication of even a
small percentage for public open space or where there were already
adequate recreational or educational facilities in the area of the pro-
posed new development.79 Municipalities are rapidly coming to ap-
preciate, however, the flexibility that per lot fees can add to the
control of vacant land development.8 0
Although the determination of what a developer must provide in
return for plat approval permits some negotiation and bargaining, the
final decision as to whether the landowner must dedicate a portion of
76. See ANDERSON 2D, supra note 73, at § 23.39.
77. Jacobsen & McHenry, Exactions on Development Permission, in WINDFALLS
FOR WIPEouTS 342, 344 (D. Hagman & D. Misczynski eds. 1978).
78. See ANDERSON 2D, supra note 73, at § 23.40.
79. For cases upholding the use of per lot fees as an alternative to land dedica-
tions to preserve open space, see East Neck Estates, Ltd. v. Luchsinger, 61 Misc. 2d
619, 621, 305 N.Y.S.2d 922, 924 (1969); Jenad, Inc. v. Village of Scarsdale, 18 N.Y.2d
78, 85, 218 N.E.2d 673, 676, 271 N.Y.S.2d 955, 958 (1966) (per lot fees no more of a
"tax" or "illegal taking" than land dedication); Jordan v. Village of Menomonee
Falls, 28 Wis. 2d 608, 611, 137 N.W.2d 442, 449 (1965) (equalization fees a concom-
mitant of land dedication provision).
80. See Associated Home Builders v. City of Walnut Creek, 4 Cal. 3d 633, 639
n.6, 484 P.2d 606, 612 n.6, 94 Cal. Rptr. 630, 636 n.6 (1971). A statement made by the
California Supreme Court is representative of this trend:
It is difficult to see why, in light of the need for recreational facilities ... and the
increased mobility of our population, a subdivider's fee in lieu of dedication may
not be used to purchase or develop land some distance from the subdivisions
which also would be available for use by subdivision residents.
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his property or pay a per lot fee instead is left to the discretion of the
municipal planning board.' 1 Planners have traditionally regarded in
lieu fees as merely a substitute for land dedications.8 2 The record on
the subject seems to suggest that a planning board could require only
one type of exaction for a single project.83 Nevertheless, since both
land dedications and fee exaction requirements are considered "rea-
sonable form[s] of village planning" 4 the use of a combination of
these exaction techniques seems sound."
Lately, increased attention has focused on the concept of using
subdivision exactions to protect areas of critical environmental con-
cern in an entire region. 6 In recognition of the particularly sensitive
nature of lands containing such features as wetlands, important water
sources, and the habitation of a fragile ecosystem, planners have rec-
ommended that an optimum twenty-five percent of a particular sub-
division or its dollar equivalent be dedicated to open space.8 7 The
actual amount exacted from a developer will generally depend, how-
ever, on the location and characteristics of the land in question. 8
Land dedications and/or fee exactions are especially useful to pro-
mote the public interest in environmental protection because they en-
able the municipality to shift environmentally sensitive lands into
public ownership and away from the development pressures which
81. See East Neck Estates, Ltd. v. Luchsinger, 61 Misc. 2d 619, 621, 305 N.Y.S.2d
922, 924 (1969); ANDERSON, supra note 23, at § 19.19.
82. See Jenad, Inc. v. Village of Scarsdale, 18 N.Y.2d 78, 85, 218 N.E.2d 673, 676,
271 N.Y.S.2d 955, 958 (1966); Jordan v. Village of Menomonee Falls, 28 Wis. 2d 608,
611, 137 N.W.2d 442, 449 (1965).
83. In one challenge to the constitutionality of a subdivision exaction ordinance
for parks, the relevant statute was construed to authorize land dedications or fee exac-
tions, but not both. See Cimarron Corp. v. Board of County Comm'rs, 563 P.2d 946,
947-48 (Colo. 1977).
84. Jenad, Inc. v. Village of Scarsdale, 18 N.Y.2d 78, 84, 218 N.E.2d 673, 676, 271
N.Y.S.2d 955, 958 (1966).
85. See N.Y. Op. State Comp. 77-447, discussed at notes 310-11 and accompany-
ing text infra; Associated Home Builders v. City of Walnut Creek, 4 Cal. 3d 633, 639,
484 P.2d 606, 611-12, 94 Cal. Rptr. 630, 635 (1971).
86. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9-463.01.C.4 (West 1977); CAL. GOV'T CODE
§ 66411 (Deering 1979 & Supp. 1980). See also Adirondack Park Agency Act, N.Y.
EXEC. LAW §§ 800-819 (McKinney Supp. 1980); California Coastal Act of 1976, CAL.
PUB. RES. CODE §§ 30000-30900 (Deering Supp. 1980); TAHOE REGIONAL PLAN.
AGENCY, LAND USE ORDINANCES 13 (1980). See generally P. SIMKO, PROMISED
LANDS: SUBDIVISIONS AND THE LAW 484 (1978) [hereinafter cited as SIMKO].
87. See SIMKO, supra note 86, at 484.
88. Id
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may otherwise entice even the most environmentally conscious land-
owner to build. Such lands will either be acquired by the subdivision
applicant and subsequently dedicated to the municipality, or ac-
quired by the municipality with the aid of subdivision fees in lieu of
dedications. Property owners who develop their land should not suf-
fer undue hardship from the exaction requirements since increased
environmental quality in the surrounding community is a saleable
amenity. Individual developer investments are secure since the sys-
tem demands similar exactions from all new developers, thereby
preventing one owner from being singled out to bear a disproportion-
ate burden of the cost of protecting valuable open space.8 9
The price of environmental protection may not be cheap. Subdivi-
sion exactions can result in a substantial increase in the cost of future
development which consumers may ultimately absorb. 9°
Given the inflated costs of participating in today's housing market,
it is likely that additional increases in home prices will effectively
preclude even greater numbers of lower- and middle-income families
from benefiting from the preservation of environmentally sensitive
lands. On the other hand, the TDR alternative discussed above im-
poses additional residential densities at the expense of rural character
as the price of environmental protection. It is arguable, however,
whether TDR's additional residential densities, marketed in the pre-
vailing suburban pattern, will substantially mitigate inherent exclu-
sionary tendencies in suburbia.
Units of municipal or county government charged with regulation
of development in environmental preservation areas should carefully
weigh the potentially exclusionary tendencies of subdivision exac-
tions against the TDR and zoning consequences of unleashing or in-
sufficiently restraining development pressures on the environment.
Any new development is likely to have an effect on the existing
environment or community. In view of the American dream that
motivates its citizenry to search for ever-greener pastures in which to
settle, it is unreasonable to expect a wide-scale prohibiton of all new
construction in the interest of environmental protection. Neverthe-
less, subdivision exactions may enable local governments to balance
these competing interests.
89. See Heyman & Gilhool, supra note 8, at 1129.
90. See generaly Mandelker, The Catch 13 of Proposition 13: Higher Development
Charges New Questionsfor Courts, ENVT'L CoM. 4-5 (July 1979) [hereinafter cited as
Mandelker, Catch 13].
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2. Local Tax Implications of Subdivision Exactions
The use of subdivision exactions could enable a municipality to
avoid the widespread loss of tax revenues that would plague the im-
plementation of a TDR scheme. Although land dedicated to the lo-
cal government in return for plat approval will be lost to the
municipal tax base, arguably this loss will be offset by the subsequent
increase in assessed valuation of the subdivision lots, as well as by the
per lot fees exacted from developers in lieu of land dedications.
The increase in value should reflect the benefits accruing to subdi-
vision lots by virtue of the preservation of natural resources in the
area, an uncertain result under the TDR alternative, where market
factors are not in tune with each other.9 In this way, proximity to
environmentally sensitive lands can be viewed as an "amenity" 92
provided by the local government which tends to increase the value
of existing property. 93 A municipality can thus generate additional
revenue from taxes levied against new subdivision lots in two ways:
first, through an increased assessed property value for purposes of the
general ad valorem property tax;94 and second, the developers' costs
of dedication and/or fee exactions are likely to be passed on to con-
sumers95 through an increased real property transfer tax which is
based on the sale price of the property.
The municipality might additionally add to its tax base from the
reassessment of property held by citizens already residing in the com-
munity. For example, the establishment of a nature preserve would
presumably benefit the entire community. If so, a municipality
should not single out new subdivisions to bear the full tax burden of
an open space exaction program.96 Any scheme proposing this type
91. See notes 28-61 and accompanying text supra.
92. This result would require that an analogy be drawn between the preservation
of natural resources and the provision of parks and school sites. The latter are gener-
ally regarded, for appraisal purposes, as "amenities" which increase the value of a
subdivision lot. Note, Subdivision Land Dedications: Objectives and Objections, 27
STAN. L. REv. 419, 429 n.24 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Dedications]. See also Ellick-
son, Suburban Growth Controls:. An Economic and Legal Analysis, 86 YALE L.J. 385,
401 n.38 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Ellickson].
93. See generally Ellickson, supra note 92.
94. Id.
95. See note 271 and accompanying text infra.
96. Otherwise, they will be found to violate most states' constitutional require-
ment of uniform property taxation. Vendetti-Siravo, Inc. v. City of Hollywood, 39
Fla. Supp. 121, 122-23 (1973).
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of differential assessment system could violate the basic premise of ad
valorem or general property taxation, namely that the increments of
value of the appraisal scale used to assess general property taxes be
uniformly applied to all land within a particular tax jurisdiction.97
Hence, the local government could acquire greater revenue through
an across-the-board increase in property taxes as well as via special
business taxes.
In any current discussion of local property taxation, however, it is
essential to consider the potential impact of a Proposition 1398 on
municipal tax powers. Provisions such as Proposition 13 attempt to
reduce local property taxes by amending the state constitution to
limit the amount of real property taxes that a municipality can levy.99
If the California ordinance proves successful, it is doubtful that prop-
erty taxes can adequately recapture and maintain the "windfall" pro-
vided property owners from the preservation of environmental
resources. Furthermore, it is unlikely that subdivision exactions can
be used exclusively for this purpose.'
One way to ensure the availability of funds to protect publicly
owned environmentally sensitive lands might be a broadly based va-
riation of a special assessment tax.10 ' If this proves fiscally impracti-
cable, or if the municipality's need for revenues otherwise becomes
acute, a local government may need to enact a preferential tax assess-
ment system. Such a system would provide that environmentally val-
uable open space remain in the hands of private owners, but that it be
taxed at a rate which reflects its actual use rather than its develop-
ment potential.'02 This scheme gives an incentive to the landowner
to retain his property in its natural state, thereby serving the munici-
pality's purpose in the protection of natural resources and the citi-
zens' interest in reduced taxes.10 3
The success of any planning device designed to protect valuable
open space depends largely on the local government's ability to de-
97. See D. MANDELKER, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN A FEDERAL SYS-
TEM 301 (1977).
98. See generally Mandelker, Catch 13, supra note 90, at 5.
99. CAL. CONST. art. XIIIA, § 2.
100. See Mandelker, Catch 13, supra note 90, at 5.
101. See notes 329-33 and accompanying text infra.
102. See Keene, Differential Assessment and the Preservation of Open Space, 14
URBAN L. ANN. 11, 14 (1977).
103. Id at 17.
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velop a flexible system of control over the use of vacant land within
its jurisdiction. This requires the establishment of guidelines that
give municipal planning boards the discretion to exact land and/or
fees from the developers as a condition for subdivision plat approval.
It also necessitates broad taxing powers to ensure that the costs of
preserving environmentally sensitive lands are distributed fairly
among all property owners, and that the municipality will have suffi-
cient resources to plan effectively for the benefit of the community as
a whole.
C. Natural Area Zoning
A more traditional approach to the municipality's environmental
goals lies in the special natural area zone approach. A consequence
of the TDR solution is a higher population density in the transfer
zone with concommitant impacts on its natural features and possible
loss of small town flavor. The subdivision exaction scheme contem-
plates a reduced population density given the unbuildable nature of
the preserved natural area, and a more costly house in the subdivi-
sion reflecting a pass-along of the exaction. A special natural area
zone approach avoids both of these consequences, but at a certain
price.
The special natural area district approach respects an area's under-
lying zoning population density assumptions and lot size require-
ments, but permits variation in all other zoning aspects, such as yard,
height, and setback regulations consistent with maximum natural
feature preservation. Subject to these standards, it permits develop-
ment within a natural area.
New York City has accorded such zoning special district status to
its large Staten Island Greenbelt area,"° comprising the highest ele-
vations along the Atlantic seaboard from Florida to Maine, and to
the topographically varied Riverdale area in the Bronx across the
Hudson from the New Jersey Palisades.
In a natural area district, the locality permits no subdivision or al-
teration of the land before filing of a land survey. The survey enu-
merates and locates all natural features found on the site, including
topographic elevations, botanic and marine environment, trees above
six inch caliper, boulders, streams and ponds.' °5 Subdivisions which
104. NEW YORK CITY ZONING REsOLUTION ch. 5, art. X, § 105 (1974).
105. Id § 105.90.
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arbitrarily create lots dense with major natural features are discour-
aged in favor of a scheme assigning to each buildable lot its fair siare
of natural features. The intent is to anticipate requests to build and
to insure as far as possible that each lot contains sufficient building
area consistent with minimal disturbance of natural features.
Building permit approval on the resulting lots is not ministerially
available; rather, the municipality balances by examining discretion-
ary criteria which insure maximum feasible environmental preserva-
tion.' 016 Materials, extent of paving, and planting are typical
considerations. The city insures compliance with conditions and re-
tention of the balance of the property in a natural state by requiring
restrictive covenants running with the land, benefiting neighbors
within the natural area districts as well as the City of New York.
Similarly, the City of Tiburon, California, placed an environmen-
tally sensitive area with magnificent views of the San Francisco Bay
in a special Residential Planned Development Zone (RPD-1). 07
This zoning reduced the as-of-right building entitlement from one
unit per acre to one unit per five acres. The Tiburon ordinance also
provided for an additional four units at the discretion of local plan-
ning officials upon a showing that the owner would incorporate the
special natural features of the area in question, such as scenic views,
topography and other open space considerations, into the building
plan. 108 The United States Supreme Court recently upheld this zon-
ing regulation in Agins v. City of Tiburon.1°9
The natural area district suggestion, applied to our hypothetical
lakefront area, could permit the retention of a maximum number of
existing trees along the shoreline or a tree retention program buffer-
ing each house and any access road thereto. It could, through related
subdivision controls, require public shoreline access. It could mini-
mize paving and consequent runoff disturbing to botanic and nearby
marine environments. Building materials could be controlled to dis-
turb the natural environment as little as possible.
Assuming the market for homes in a natural area with special envi-
ronmental features primarily encompasses families looking for a sta-
ble, permanent community, the adoption of special natural area
106. Id § 105.021.
107. TIBURON, CAL., ORDINANCES 123 N.S. and 124 N.S. (June 28, 1973), ciedin
Agins v. City of Tiburon, 100 S. Ct. 2138, 2140 (1980).
108. See Agins v. City of Tiburon, 100 S.Ct. at 2142.
109. Id. 2140-41 (1980). See notes 338-47 and accompanying text infra.
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district zoning controls would benefit the market. These controls do
not exclude newcomers but instead insure assimilation in a manner
deferential to the natural environment. Some construction costs are
incurred in guarding against the indiscriminate leveling of land, bull-
dozing of trees, shielding of watercourses and the like, but these costs
only add to the resale values in the neighborhood. Another cost of
the process involves delay in reviewing plans to assure the abovemen-
tioned desirable results.
New York City's experience in the two areas where these regula-
tions are in force indicates no resistance by builders and extraordi-
nary citizen enthusiasm for the special review concept and the results
derived therefrom. In light of the Supreme Court's ruling in Agins v.
City of Tiburon, one may anticipate national acceptance of this con-
cept.
Tax consequences of the natural area concept have reflected con-
tinuing upward assessments in such areas. This result attests to the
fact that designing communities consistent with nature adds to the
tax base.'1 °
III. A LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS
A. An Environmental Reserve: Reasonable Regulation or Invalid
"Taking?"
Does highly restrictive regulation of environmentally sensitive land
spell "taking?"
According to the test laid down by the United States Supreme
Court in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,'1 ' a court will invali-
date a land use regulation upon a showing that the ordinance is
"clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to
the public health, safety, morals or general welfare.""' 2 To defeat
such a claim, a city must prove, among other things, that the affected
property owner is not deprived of "all profitable remaining use" of
his land and that the ordinance is "rationally related to the munici-
pality's comprehensive plan.""' 3
Since Euclid, courts have sometimes equated invalidity with "tak-
ing," a confusion which has begun to dissipate in the wake of recent
110. See generally I. MCHARG, DESIGNING WITH NATURE 153-95 (1969).
111. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
112. Id at 395.
113. See Elliott & Marcus, supra note 29, at 58-59.
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New York Court of Appeals decisions." 4
The authority of a local government to regulate the use of priv;ate
property derives from its police power.115 The basic premise of any
land use scheme is that "all property is acquired and held under the
tacit condition that it shall not be so used to injure the equal rights of
others, or to destroy or generally impair the public rights and inter-
ests of the community.""' 6 Local zoning ordinances were originally
enacted to protect community residents from the harmful effects of
what were regarded at common law as nuisances.117 Recently, the
Supreme Court has recognized that "the police power is not confined
to the elimination of filth, stench and unhealthy places. It is ample to
lay out zones where. . . the blessings of quiet seclusion and clean air
make the area a sanctuary for people.""It' The Court's rationale for
the exercise of this power is that "land-use restrictions or controls
[serve] to enhance the quality of life by preserving the character and
desirable aesthetic features of a city. . . 19
The Supreme Court recently identified three factors, any one of
which could convert an apparently valid "public program adjusting
114. See, e.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 42 N.Y.2d 324, 366
N.E.2d 1271, 397 N.Y.S.2d 914 (1977), aff'd, 438 U.S. 104 (1978), rehearing denied,
439 U.S. 883 (1978); Fred F. French Inv. Co. v. City of New York, 39 N.Y.2d 587, 350
N.E.2d 381, 385 N.Y.S.2d 5 (1976), appeal dismissed, 429 U.S. 990 (1976).
115. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
116. Commonwealth v. Tewksbury, 11 Met. 55 (Mass. 1846), cited in Potomac
Sand and Gravel Co. v. Governor of Md., 266 Md. 358, 367-69, 293 A.2d 241, 247
(1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1040 (1972).
117. See Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 595 (1962) (public inter-
est requires such protection); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 411 (1915) (brick
manufacture a nuisance in certain localities under certain circumstances, therefore
subject to state police power regulation). See also Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26
N.Y.2d 219, 228, 257 N.E.2d 870, 873-75, 309 N.Y.S.2d 312, 317 (1970) (cement
plant's dust a nuisance eligible for damages remedy but not injunctive relief).
118. Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 9 (1974).
119. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 129 (1978). See
also City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 304 (1976) (New Orleans street
vendors subject to state police power regulation as important part of appearance and
custom of the city); Young v. American Mini-Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 71 (1976)
(city may prohibit "adult" motion picture theatres from certain urban neighborhoods
to preserve quality of urban life); Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 9-10
(1974) (municipality may prohibit occupancy of a dwelling by two or more persons
who are unrelated); Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954) (legislature empowered
to determine that community should be beautiful, spacious and well-balanced as well
as healthy, clean and protected); Welch v. Swasey, 214 U.S. 91, 108 (1909) (aesthetic
considerations proper justification for exercise of state police power).
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the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common
good"' 20 into an unconstitutional taking.
First, a government restriction may have such "an unduly harsh
impact upon the owner's use of the property"' 21 or "may so frustrate
distinct investment-backed expectations as to amount to a 'tak-
ing., 122 (Harshness, or absence of a reasonable beneficial use.)
Second, a government acquisition of built or natural resources "to
permit or facilitate uniquely public functions" may constitute a "tak-
ing."' 23 (Appropriation, not present where a public trust or custom
prevail.)
Third, a government restriction on real property "not reasonably
necessary to the effectuation of a substantial public purpose"' 24 may
constitute a "taking." (Arbitrariness, or discord with a comprehen-
sive plan.)
Following is a review of the components of this tripartite test-
existence of a reasonable beneficial use, applicability of the law of
custom or the public trust doctrine, and accord with a comprehensive
plan-as applied to environmental preservation measures.
1. A "'reasonable benecial use. " Public intervention in the form
of land use regulation often reduces the property's value to its own-
er. ' 2  As long as the affected property owner is able to make some
"reasonable beneficial use" of his land, however, a court will prob-
ably find that the ordinance in question does not violate the constitu-
tional prohibition against the deprivation of private property without
due process of law. In so doing, most courts are likely to rule that the
public interest protected outweighs the private interest in the devel-
opment potential of a particular parcel of land.'26 In its most recent
120. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
121. Id at 127.
122. Id
123. Id at 128.
124. Id at 127.
125. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 42 N.Y.2d 324, 335, 336 N.E.2d
1271, 1278, 397 N.Y.S.2d 914, 921 (1977).
126. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 110 (1978)
(Grand Central Station too important a landmark to risk as part of redevelopment
scheme); Sibson v. State, 115 N.H. 124, 129, 336 A.2d 239, 242 (1975) (state action
sustained unless public interest so clearly of minor importance as to make the restric-
tion of individual rights unreasonable); State ex rel Thornton v. Hay, 254 Or. 584,
590, 462 P.2d 671, 674 (1969) (public use easements for shoreline and beaches pre-
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discussion of the taking issue, Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City
of New York, 27 the Supreme Court made clear that a property own-
er is entitled to a "reasonable return" from his land commensurate
with his "distinct investment-backed expectations. '  But what is
reasonable "in turn depends upon a total view of the relevant facts
and circumstances."' 29 What, for example, is the distinct investment-
backed expectation of an owner who has inherited or bought "at a
song" a centuries-old swamp full of flora and fauna which is of inte-
gral value to the community?
A return's reasonableness depends not only "upon the value of the
property, but also upon the owner's desire to expand the prop-
erty." 130 Any expansion must, however, be a reasonable property ad-
aptation 3 ' as determined by its general location, the degree of
development the area has so far sustained, and the extent to which
the expansion may encroach upon the remaining vacant land in the
community. In other words, the existing character of an area will
influence the owner's distinct investment-backed expectations. Since
land use controls purport to regulate a property owner's right to build
"where necessary for the public welfare,"' 2 a regulation is not inva-
lid simply because it deprives a landowner of "the most profitable or
most beneficial use of his property."''
In no area of the law is the relative nature of a landowner's right to
a reasonable return more clearly highlighted than in the field of envi-
ronmental protection. The current awareness of the importance' 34 of
served by statute); Just v. Marinette County, 56 Wis. 2d 7, 22-26, 201 N.W.2d 761,
770-72 (1972) (preservation of natural wetlands outweighs value of development po-
tential).
127. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
128. Id at 127.
129. Fred F. French Inv. Co. v. City of New York, 77 Misc. 2d 199, 202, 352
N.Y.S.2d 762, 766 (Sup. Ct. 1973).
130. Nate, The Freshwater Wetlands Act: Permissible Regulation v. Construetlive
Taking, 43 ALBANY L. REv. 295, 305 (1979).
131. Id
132. Candlestick Properties, Inc. v. San Francisco Bay Conserv. and Dcv.
Comm'n, 11 Cal. App. 3d 557, 571, 89 Cal. Rptr. 897, 905 (1970).
133. Nate, supra note 130, at 304.
134. Simko, supra note 86, at 721, stated:
Open space, besides its obvious aesthetic and recreational appeal, serves many
valuable ecological functions. It provides a habitat for wildlife. Its vegetation
buffers noise and serves as a natural air-pollution filter, absorbing carbon dioxide
and other pollutants and giving out oxygen. Its soils absorb rain and run-off,
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protecting precious natural resources is new. 135 It reflects a shift
away from traditional notions of property rights based on a "hierar-
chy in which the right to profit stands first, with a grudging exception
for exigent public need."'136 In the past, whether a particular ordi-
nance resulted in an impermissible taking of private property de-
pended largely on "the economic effects that occur[red] solely within
the physical boundaries of [an individual owner's] property." '137 The
realization at the heart of the present environmental protection
movement that "property does not exist in isolation"'138 has prompted
the legal profession to alter its perception of private property rights
and to consider the idea that the land system in this country is "an
interdependent network of competing uses."' 3 9 Thus a property
owner's claim that he has been deprived of the right to a "reasonable
return" from his property should be evaluated in the context of the
general public welfare of the entire community or area in which the
particular parcel of land is located."
One mitigating factor in this potentially harsh regulatory climate
could be a preferential tax assessment system"4 which rewards the
owner who keeps his land in its natural state. An existing open use
lessening flooding potential. Preservation of open space is often necessary to pre-
serve natural drainage courses such as arroyos, creeks, and swampy areas, which
function as natural water-purification and dispersion systems.
135. According to one authority, "fulntil the last two decades, all land was [re-
garded as] 'developable.'" Id at 485.
136. Sax, Takings. Priyate Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149, 151
(1971).
137. Id at 152.
138. Id
139. Id at 150.
140. Steel Hill Dev., Inc. v. Town of Sanbornton, 469 F.2d 956 (Ist Cir. 1972).
See also Golden v. Planning Bd., 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138
(1972), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1003 (1974) (zoning ordinance delaying subdivision
development until municipal services could accomodate subdivision held not a tak-
ing); State ex re. Thornton v. Hay, 254 Or. 584, 462 P.2d 671 (1969) (public interest
and benefit of shorelands and beaches outweigh potential development value to pri-
vate individuals).
141. Golden v. Planning Bd., 30 N.Y.2d 359, 380-81,285 N.E.2d 291, 303-04, 334
N.Y.S.2d 138, 154-55 (1972). See notes 101-03 and accompanying text supra. This
approach has also been used with varying degrees of success in the growth manage-
ment systems of Ramapo, New York, Petaluma, California, and the Twin Cities,
Minnesota. For more detailed discussion of preferential tax assessment systems in the
context of growth management, see generally Keene, supra note 102.
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might well be "reasonably beneficial" with the assurance of a prefer-
ential tax assessment.
2. Custom andpublic trust: doctrines which excuse government re-
source acquisition. Where natural usage of sensitive environmental
land has been customary, restrictions which assure continuance of
such natural usage are apt to find sanction under either the law of
custom or the public trust doctrine.
An example of this approach to environmental regulation can be
found in Sibson v. State. 42 In Sibson, the New Hampshire Supreme
Court upheld the denial of a permit application to fill a four-acre
tract of salt marshland. 143 In so doing, the court rejected a claim that
the denial deprived the owners of all reasonable beneficial use of
their property.'" The court declared that its decision would have no
effect on the existing value of the owners' property.' It would deny
the owners "none of the normal traditional uses of the marshland
including wildlife observation, hunting, haying of marshgrass, clam
and shellfish harvesting, and aesthetic purposes." 46 The court found
that the owners had been deprived of only a speculative profit, an
insufficient basis for holding that a particular government action had
effected an invalid taking of private property. 47 In arriving at this
conclusion, the court balanced the private interest in such speculative
profit against what it found to be the paramount public interest in
"proscribing future activities that would be harmful to the public" if
the salt marshlands were destroyed.'l4  Significantly, it noted that
the land "remained as it had been for milleniums."' 49 Moreover, the
court cited Just v. Marinette County,'50 a leading case expounding the
applicability of the public trust doctrine to environmentaly sensitive
lands.
The shift in attitude toward greater appreciation of the public in-
142. Sibson v. State, 115 N.H. 124, 336 A.2d 239 (1975).
143. Id at 127, 336 A.2d at 241.
144. Id at 129, 336 A.2d at 243.
145. Id
146. Id
147. Id.
148. Id
149. Id
150. 56 Wis. 2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761 (1972), discussed at note 169 and accompany-
ing text infra.
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terest inherent in conservation regulation has also coincided with a
resurgence of interest in the idea that a legally recognizable public
right to the preservation of certain natural resources can arise
through custom.' 51 The rule that an interest in property can accrue
by custom derives from a principle of early English property law that
permitted the general public to acquire rights in land held in private
ownership. 152 Customary rights arise by "common consent and uni-
form practice."' 53 To make such a determination, a court must find
that, first, the usage of the land in question is ancient; second, the
right has been exercised without interruption by any other party with
a paramount claim; third, "the customary use [has been] peaceable
and free from dispute;" fourth, the determination is reasonable; fifth,
the practice is firmly established in the community; sixth, the custom
is "obligatory" in that the private landowner has no opportunity to
choose whether he will recognize the custom; and, finally, the custom
does not conflict with other laws or customs.
15 4
Although courts in the United States have not widely recognized
the doctrine of custom,'55 the Oregon Supreme Court noted in State
ex rel. Thornton v. Hay'56 that the doctrine is particularly applicable
to large areas of land possessing unique natural features.'57 Thorn-
ton was an action brought by the State of Oregon to enjoin the con-
struction of a fence on dry sand property owned by the proprietors of
a tourist facility.' The construction of the fence would have pre-
vented the general public from enjoying an area which had been in
public use "as long as the land had been inhabited."' 159 It also would
have conflicted with a long-standing state policy in favor of uniform
treatment of the Oregon coastline."6 The court found that the "an-
cient" public recreational use of the dry sand area gave sufficient no-
151. See State ex rel Thornton v. Hay, 254 Or. 584,462 P.2d 671 (1969). See also
notes 156-61 and accompanying text infra.
152. BuRBY, supra note 10, at 702.
153. BOUVIER's LAW DIcT., Rawless Third Revision 742, cited in State ex rel
Thornton v. Hay, 254 Or. at 595, 462 P.2d at 677.
154. 1 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTAiES 75-78, cited in State ex reZ Thornton v.
Hay, 254 Or. at 595-97, 462 P.2d at 677.
155. BURBY, supra note 10, at 702.
156. 254 Or. 584, 462 P.2d 671 (1969).
157. id at 595, 462 P.2d at 676.
158. Id at 585, 462 P.2d at 672.
159. Id at 595, 462 P.2d at 676-77.
160. Id at 594, 462 P.2d at 676.
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tice of custom to the owners of the tourist facility so as to preclude
the appropriation of the property for private use.' 6 '
The notion that the public welfare is paramount in situations
where private landowners threaten environmental resources is also at
the heart of the public trust doctrine.' 62 Under this theory, certain
rights in property, for example, the right to develop a particular par-
cel of land, are "held by one party (in this case, the private property
owner) for the benefit of the public at large or some considerable
portion thereof."' I6 3 Historically, the public trust doctrine has been
applied to restrict the rights of landowners to develop property lo-
cated adjacent to, and including, public waterways. 1" The interests
sought to be protected by the trust are navigation, ports, free passage,
commerce, fishing, conservation, and aesthetics.' 65
Recently, courts around the country have expanded the concept of
the public trust to advance the aims of the environmental protection
movement.' 66 The doctrine essentially "makes the public guardian
161. Id at 598, 462 P.2d at 678.
162. See J. SAx, DEFENDING THE ENVIRONMENT ch. 7 (1971); V. YANNACONE &
B. COHEN, 1 ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS AND REMEDIES ch. 2 (1971); Cohen, The Con-
stitution, the Public Trust Doctrine, and the Environment, 1970 UTAH L. REV. 388;
Esposito, Air and Water Pollution: What To Do While Waiting For Washington, 5
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 32 (1970); Fraser, Title to the Soil Under Public Waters, 5
LAND & WATER L. REV. 391 (1970); Sax, 7he Public Trust Doctrine In Natural Re-
source Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471 (1970); Waite, Pub-
lic Rights To Use And Have Access To Navigable Waters, 1958 Wis. L. REV. 335;
Note, PublicAccess To Beaches, 22 STAN. L. REV. 564 (1970); Comment, Private Fills
In Navigable Waters: 4 Common Law Approach, 60 CAL. L. REV. 225 (1972); Com-
ment, Role of Local Government in Water Law, 1959 Wis. L. REV. 117. See generally
Berland, Toward the True Meaning of the Public Trust, 1 SEA GRANT L.J. 83 (1976);
Montgomery, The Public Trust Doctrine in Public Land Law: Its Application in the
JudicialReview ofLand Classpication Decisions, 8 WILLAMETTE L.J. 135 (1972); Note,
he Public Trust in Public Waterways, 7 URBAN L. ANN. 219 (1974) [hereinafter cited
as Public Waterways]; Comment, Governmental Restriction of Water Use, 1959 Wis. L.
REV. 341.
163. Public Waterways, supra note 162, at 220.
164. Id
165. Note, The Public Trust in Tidal Areas. 4 Sometime Submerged Traditional
Doctrine, 79 YALE L.J. 762, 777-78 (1970).
166. See, e.g., Just v. Marinette County, 56 Wis. 2d 7, 17, 201 N.W.2d 761, 768
(1972) (shoreland zoning ordinance preventing changes in nature of land without spe-
cial permit upheld). See also Brecciaroli v. Connecticut Comm'r of Envt'l Protection,
168 Conn. 349, 362 A.2d 948 (1975) (not an unconstitutional taking where plaintiff,
though precluded from making certain use of tidal wetland, could still apply to fill
lesser amount of land and could apply to make reasonable unregulated use of land);
Sibson v. State, 115 N.H. 124, 336 A.2d 239 (1975) (denial of permit to fill salt marsh-
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of those valuable natural resources which are not capable of self-
regeneration and for which substitutes cannot be made by man."' 6 7
To protect these lands, care must be taken to limit the activities per-
mitted to such traditional uses as farming, fishing, or recreation, or to
"the natural uses peculiar to that resource." 68 Consequently, the no-
tion of a reasonable beneficial use for environmentally sensitive lands
held in public trust will be restricted to those activities which will not
impair the public interest in the preservation of the targeted areas.
A leading case expounding this doctrine is Just v. Marinette
County.169 Therein, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin upheld the
constitutionality of a zoning ordinance under which the Justs were
denied a special permit to develop their land located near a navigable
lake and a navigable river.'70 In so doing, the court declared that
[t]he state of Wisconsin under the trust doctrine has a duty to
eradicate the present pollution and to prevent further pollution
in its navigable waters. . . . [This duty] requires the state not
only to promote navigation but also to protect and preserve
those waters for fishing, recreation and scenic beauty.'
In considering the Justs' claim that the ordinance was confiscatory,
the court found that their conception of value was "based upon
changing the character of the land at the expense of harm to public
rights."' 72 The court did not regard this loss in value as sufficiently
"essential or controlling" to preclude it from holding that:
An owner of land has no absolute right to change the essential
natural character of his land so as to use it for a purpose for
which it was unsuited in its natural state and which injures the
rights of others. The exercise of the police power in zoning must
be reasonable and we think it is not an unreasonable exercise of
that power to prevent harm to public rights by limiting the use of
land upheld); Tom's River Affiliates v. Department of Envt'l Protection, 140 N.J.
Super. 135, 355 A.2d 679 (1976) (court upheld denial of permit for condominium
construction in coastal review area).
167, Cohen, The Constitution, The Public Trust Doctrine, and the Environment,
1970 UTAH L. REV. 488.
168. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resources Law: Effective Judicial
Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471, 477 (1970).
169. 56 Wis. 2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761 (1972).
170. Id
171. Id at 16, 201 N.W.2d at 768.
172. Id at 23, 201 N.W.2d at 771.
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private property to its natural uses. 173
3. In accordance with a comprehensiveplan (lack of arbitrariness).
In general, courts are willing to find a rational ground for singling
out a class of landowners to bear "the cost of a land use beneficial to
the public" '17 4 if the regulation accords with the municipality's com-
prehensive plan. 175 A comprehensive plan controls and directs the
community's development through zoning based on the land's pres-
ent and potential uses.'17 The power of a local government and its
planning board to enact such a plan derives from the Standard Zon-
ing Enabling Act,' 7 7 a model state statute authorizing municipalities
to enact comprehensive zoning ordinances in the interest of protect-
ing the general public welfare. 178
The standard of "in accordance with a comprehensive plan" is
meant to provide courts with an analytical framework within which
to adjudicate the effect of various land use controls on individual
property owners. In so doing, a court must determine whether the
ordinance in question logically relates to a general community inter-
est. 17 9 A comprehensive plan enables the court to differentiate be-
tween zoning motivated by favoritism and zoning enacted for the
public good.'
The purpose behind the "comprehensive plan" test is to prevent
arbitrary and piecemeal zoning.' Consequently, before a court will
find any land use ordinance valid, the municipality must demonstrate
that the means it selected to achieve what it deems to be a "substan-
tial public purpose"'8 2 are reasonably related to the governmental
objective at hand. Evidence tending to show that an ordinance will
173. Id at 17, 201 N.W.2d at 768.
174. Elliott & Marcus, supra note 29, at 60. But see Vernon Park Realty, Inc. v.
City of Mount Vernon, 307 N.Y. 493, 121 N.E.2d 517 (1954).
175. See generally Haar, supra note 30.
176. ROHAN, supra note 22, at § 37.01.
177. UNITED STATES DEP'T OF COMMERCE, THE STANDARD STATE ZONING EN-
ABLING ACT (1926).
178. Id § 1.
179. Heyman, Innovative Land Regulation and Comprehensive Planning, in THE
NEW ZONING: LEGAL, ADMINISTRATIVE, AND ECONOMIC CONCEPTS AND TECH-
NIQUES 23, 27 (N. Marcus & M. Groves eds. 1970).
180. Id
181. RoHAN, supra note 22, at § 37.01.
182. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 127 (1978).
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result in an alteration of the existing character of an area in favor of a
particular class of property owners to the detriment of the general
community will result in the invalidation of the regulation as illegal
"spot zoning."' 183
It is thus clear that a zoning ordinance or land use control places a
restriction on an owner's right to make use of his property. To the
extent of the limitation, the affected landowner is treated differently
from other property owners in the community not subject to the par-
ticular restraints of the regulation in question. If, however, the mu-
nicipality applies the regulation uniformly to all similarly situated
properties, and if there is a discernible rational basis for the particu-
lar land use classification in the comprehensive plan, a court will up-
hold the regulation as a valid exercise of a municipality's police
power. 84
Any environmental protection measure which is to survive judicial
scrutiny must be in accordance with a comprehensive plan. Although
the public purpose of preserving important natural resources is unim-
peachable once documented, that documentation must satisfy a
three-part test.'" 5 The municipality must show first, that the plan-
ning mechanism employed will in fact assure protection of the re-
sources; second, that the regulation will not cause an arbitrary class
of landowners to bear a disproportionate burden of the costs of pre-
serving the natural resources;'8 6 and third, that the program excludes
measures "not reasonably necessary to the effectuation of a substan-
183. See Udell v. Haas, 21 N.Y.2d 463, 235 N.E.2d 897, 288 N.Y.S.2d 888 (1968).
For the suggestion that inadequate planning in the implementation of a TDR scheme
can also lead to spot zoning, see Fred F. French Inv. Co. v. City of New York, 77
Misc. 2d 199, 352 N.Y.S.2d 762 (Sup. Ct. 1973).
184. Elliott & Marcus, supra note 29, at 60.
185. See cases cited in note 166 supra. Accord, Steel Hill Dev., Inc. v. Town of
Sanbornton, 469 F.2d 956, 961-62 (Ist Cir. 1972) (legislation to protect existing land
uses respected by the court); Candlestick Properties, Inc. v. San Francisco Bay Con-
serv. and Dev. Comm'n, 11 Cal. App. 3d 557, 571, 89 Cal. Rptr. 897, 905 (1970)
(legislation declaring the importance of preserving the natural resource of San Fran-
cisco Bay respected by the court); Potomac Sand and Gravel Co. v. Governor of Md.,
266 Md. 358, 373, 293 A.2d 241, 249 (1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1040 (1972) (legisla-
tion protecting wetlands respected by the court); Turnpike Realty Co. v. Town of
Dedham, 362 Mass. 221, 236, 284 N.E.2d 891, 901 (1972) (court resolved all rational
presumptions in favor of zoning to preserve floodplain); State ex rel Thornton v.
Hay, 254 Or. 584, 587-99, 462 P.2d 671, 673-78 (1969) (legislation recognizing com-
mon law right to use beaches respected by the court).
186. Elliott & Marcus, supra note 29, at 59-60. In Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City
of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 135 (1978), the Supreme Court held that owners of desig-
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tial public purpose. '  In this regard, Penn Central decided that se-
lective designation of landmark areas violates neither principles of
uniformity of regulation nor fair assignment of preservation bur-
dens-provided the designations proceed under a program of com-
prehensive character.
188
Thus, courts may uphold a planning device designed to restrict the
right to develop land containing important natural resources, pro-
vided that it preserves the owner's right to a beneficial use of prop-
erty; it derives from a long-standing custom in the community, or
from a public trust governmentally created to protect the public inter-
est in the preservation of environmentally sensitive lands; or it
meshes with the community's comprehensive plan.
Under each of these doctrines, the owner's right to make some use
of his property originates from distinct investment-backed expecta-
tions based upon existing custom in the sensitive natural area. Some
municipalities may decide to use TDR, 189 dedications or subdivision
exaction proceeds, preferential tax assessments, 190 or a special natu-
ral area zoning district to mitigate the possibly harsh impact of the
above-discussed doctrines on owners. If so, that decision should rest
on a knowledgeable analysis of burdens and benefits in the particular
area of regulatory application. Adequate legal justification for the
imposition of such development restrictions exists-provided they are
administered in a uniform, reasonable fashion and in accordance
with the community's comprehensive plan.
B. TDR." The Legal Questions
1. Is TDR a substitute for "reasonable beneficial use?"
The basic premise behind TDR is that the value of land in a dense
urban area "lies in the profit-making structure that can be built on
nated landmarks benefited from the comprehensive regulatory scheme and so could
not be said to bear any disproportionate burden.
187. 438 U.S. at 127.
188. Id at 132.
189. By printing development rights (e.g., for a shoreline) and allowing their
transfer to an ecologically "safe" area, a community may be creating for the first time
those "distinct investment-backed expectations" which will form a more difficult basis
for evaluating the reasonableness of any restriction placed on such property, to say
nothing of political reaction in the ecologically safe area which receives the develop-
ment rights.
190. See notes 101-03 and accompanying text supra.
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it."'' Since a development right is the owner's right to build or de-
velop his land,' 92 it is generally regarded as a property owner's most
valuable commodity. Courts have recognized that the development
potential of a particular parcel of land is a legally recognizable inter-
est severable from the land. 193 According to traditional TDR theory,
the severed development rights can be sold for a price that will sub-
stantially diminish the burden imposed on a preservation landowner
from the loss of his right to develop an individual site.194 This pro-
cess would insure the landowner's ability to make a reasonable return
on his investment.
Without some assurance that the rights will actually be bought and
attached to a site within the transfer district, however, TDR will not
protect a landowner's "distinct investment-backed expectations."' 95
TDR compels an owner "to enter an unpredictable real estate market
to find a suitable receiving lot for the rights."' 196 This uncertainty
devalues development rights even before they are severed and de-
stroys the property's economic value.' 97 Similar consequences could
ensue in either heavily developed urban areas without available
transfer sites or insufficiently developed areas lacking effective mar-
ket demand for development rights. 198
If an affected landowner cannot rely on the sale of development
rights to match his financial loss, the only alternative to an invalid
191. Marcus, Mandatory TDR, supra note 32, at 105.
192. Chavooshian, supra note 11, at 171.
193. See Newport Assoc. v. Solow, 30 N.Y.2d 263, 283 N.E.2d 600, 332 N.Y.S.2d
617 (1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 931 (1973).
194. See Shlaes, supra note 28, at 8, THE TRANSFER oF DEvELOPMENT RIGHTS, at
332. The holding of the New York Court of Appeals in Fred F. French Inv. Co. v.
City of New York, 39 N.Y.2d 587, 595, 350 N.E.2d 381, 386, 385 N.Y.S.2d 5, 9-10
(1976), indicates that TDR is not intended to provide preservation property owners
with the same "just compensation" owed to landowners whose property was made
subject to an exercise of the eminent domain power. Instead, TDRs should be re-
garded more as "fair compensation for a developer whose rights could be substan-
tially diminished under more traditional zoning regulation with no compensation
whatsoever." Marcus, Mandatory TDR, supra note 32, at 104.
195. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. at 127. See also
Fred F. French Inv. Co. v. City of New York, 39 N.Y.2d at 596-97, 350 N.E.2d at 387,
385 N.Y.S.2d at 11.
196. Fred F. French Inv. Co. v. City of New York, 39 N.Y.2d at 595, 350 N.E.2d
at 388, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 12.
197. Id
198. Unconstitutionality, supra note 56, at 1111. See also Address by David
Heater, Bettman Symposium, Am. Soc'y of Plan. Officials (May 13, 1974).
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taking under a regulatory preservation mandate is to determine
whether the owner's current uses of the preservation property enable
him to make a "reasonable return" on his investment. The outcome
of this inquiry depends on the existing and permitted uses of the
property, the owner's reasonably based expectations as to develop-
ment in the area, and in certain cases, the general community's cus-
tomary view of the property.
Property ownership in highly dense urban areas is characteristi-
cally subject to intense development pressures. In this context, mar-
ket realities may lead property owners to expect that they can make
some use of their land that reflects its competitive value. As evi-
denced by the decision of the New York Court of Appeals in Fred F
French Investing Co. v. City of New York,199 the designation of pri-
vate property for passive recreation use in the urban core is invalid
absent adequate protection of the affected landowner's economic in-
terests; in this case, adequate protection required not only severance
of the development rights but also their attachment to a site within
the transfer district."o° The court reasoned that it would be improper
to use the police power to impose the disproportionate burden of the
costs of preserving open space on the owners of single properties.20'
The effect of the zoning ordinance in French was to deprive the park
property owner of his property rights by destroying the property's
economic value.2°2
Nevertheless, the right of a landowner to make a reasonable return
on his investment, even in an urban real estate market, does not man-
date the right to develop for the highest possible return, 20 3 particu-
larly where an existing structure on the land meets the owner's
"distinct investment-backed expectations." 2° This was the Supreme
Court's rationale in affirming New York City's designation of Grand
199. 39 N.Y.2d 587, 350 N.E.2d 381,385 N.Y.S.2d 5 (1976), appealdismissed, 429
U.S. 990 (1976).
200. Id at 597, 350 N.E.2d at 387, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 11.
201. Id at 599, 350 N.E.2d at 389, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 12.
202. Id at 597, 350 N.E.2d at 387, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 11.
203. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 136 (1978)
(landmark preservation law limiting future use while protecting past use held not a
taking). See also Society for Ethical Culture v. New York City Landmarks Preserv.
Comm'n, 68 A.D.2d 112,416 N.Y.S.2d 246 (1979), aff'd, N.Y. Ct. App., slip. op., Dec.
18, 1980; Shepard v. Skaneateles, 300 N.Y. 115, 89 N.E.2d 619, 91 N.Y.S.2d 187
(1949) (zoning change from mercantile to residential not a taking).
204. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. at 127.
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Central Terminal as a landmark in the Penn Central case. 20 5 Accord-
ing to the Court, the overriding public interest in the preservation of
the Beaux-Arts Terminal, and the prevention of harm that would re-
sult from its destruction, outweighed the Railroad's right to a
financial return greater than what it was currently receiving from the
existing terminal.2° The Court found that the landmark designation
did "not interfere in any way with the present uses of the terminal,"
and that there was nothing in the record to warrant the finding "of an
intention to prohibit any construction above the Terminal."2 These
factors, in addition to the TDR option made available to the railroad,
led the Court to uphold this application of New York City's
landmark law to the Terminal as a reasonable regulation "substan-
tially related to the promotion of the general welfare."2 °8
The availability of existing structures which can be used for profit-
making purposes (or in other words, which can be put to a reasonable
beneficial use) can lighten the burden of preservation designations in
urban areas. TDR options add to the reasonableness of these desig-
nations. On the other hand, undeveloped suburban and rural com-
munities contemplating TDR options to provide needed mitigation to
the owners of environmentally designated vacant land lack such a
pre-existing reasonable beneficial use. The inevitable fluctuations in
any development rights market will only add another unreliable
"benefit" under the French analysis. In "taking" cases, any ordi-
nance which restricts the uses of undeveloped property to those asso-
ciated with the land in its natural state could well be invalid since it
effectively precludes the owner from realizing the development po-
tential of his land. 209
There has, however, been increasing judicial recognition of the
idea that a landowner has "no absolute right to change the essential
205. Id
206. Id at 137.
207. Id at 136.
208. Id at 138.
209. See, e.g., State v. Johnson, 265 A.2d 711 (Me. 1970) (wetlands act restrictions
precluding filling of otherwise valueless land constitute an unreasonable exercise of
police power and therefore a taking); Morris County Land Improvement Co. v.
Township of Parsippany-Troy Hills, 40 N.J. 539, 193 A.2d 232 (1963) (zoning ordi-
nance which prevents land use for any reasonable purpose is confiscatory and beyond
police power); Spears v. Berle, 63 A.D.2d 372, 407 N.Y.S.2d 590 (1978) (where wet-
lands act prohibits the only economic use of property, use must be permitted or land
must be taken in condemnation proceeding).
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natural character of his land."21 Consequently, if property owners
were to bring a taking claim against the designation of their land
within a preservation zone, it is likely that a court would uphold the
TDR ordinance in question as a legitimate police power measure
designed to mitigate burdens on owners to prevent the destruction of
the area's natural resources.2" Nor could the regulation be said to
impose unreasonable financial loss on the landowners since the re-
strictions would not affect any of the existing limited uses of the prop-
erty.2 2 Essential to this argument is the absence of distinct
investment-backed expectations of the owner at the time of his acquisi-
tion.
Courts have found uses such as general recreation, agriculture, and
horticulture sufficient to provide a "reasonable beneficial use" to an
owner of undeveloped, environmentally sensitive land.2" 3 It is thus
questionable whether the concept of development rights transfer is
even necessary to preservation in rural and suburban areas with lim-
ited growth expectations. The line of cases following Just v. Marinette
County indicates that where the purpose of a particular ordinance is
the protection of natural resources, the development potential of
210. Just v. Marinette County, 56 Wis. 2d 7, 17, 201 N.W.2d 761, 768 (1972). See
also cases cited in note 166 supra.
The idea that a regulation of the use of land prevents the owner from making
money, assumes that a landowner has a constitutional right to use and develop
his land for some purpose which will result in personal profit, regardless of the
effect that suct development will have on the public. Such a holding gives land
as a commodity a constitutional status higher than other commodities--a status it
no longer deserves.
Bosselman, Callies, & Banta, The Taking Issue 240 (written for the Council on Envi-
ronmental Quality, 1973).
211. Spagna, supra note 63, at 20-21. See also notes 69 and 185 supra.
212. Steel Hill Dev., Inc. v. Town of Sanbornton, 469 F.2d 956, 963 (1st Cir. 1972)
(zoning ordinance increasing minimum lot size not a taking as property not rendered
"useless"); Brecciaroli v. Connecticut Comm'r of Envt'l Protection, 168 Conn. 349,
358, 362 A.2d 948, 953 (1975) (no taking where permit denied for wetland develop-
ment but allowed for unprotected portion of property); Sibson v. State, 115 N.H. 124,
129 n.104, 336 A.2d 239, 243 n.104 (1975) (wetlands development permit denial does
not foreclose existing uses of hunting, wildlife observation, shellfish harvesting and so
does not constitute a taking); Just v. Marinette County, 56 Wis. 2d 7, 17, 201 N.W.2d
761,768 (1972) (reasonable exercise of police power to prevent public injury by limit-
ing use of private property to its natural uses not a taking). Accord, Penn Cent.
Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 137 (1978) (preservation of designated
landmark by limiting use to existing uses not a taking).
213. See Turnpike Realty Co. v. Town of Dedham, 362 Mass. 221, 235, 284
N.E.2d 891, 899 (1972).
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these lands is limited at best.214 Hence the very premise of TDR-
that a property owner shall not be deprived of his right to build-
becomes immediately suspect. There may be no right to build.
Courts have recognized that local governments have the authority
to impose growth control measures where necessary to protect envi-
ronmentally sensitive lands and to preserve the small town character
of their communities.2 5 Consequently, in such jurisdictions, it can-
not be said that a preservation landowner has been deprived of a
legally protected interest sufficient to warrant the issuance of transfer-
able development rights which would threaten the community's other
goals. Only where a TDR scheme fits within those goals and the
community is anxious to concede further equity to regulated land-
owners should it be considered.
Uncontrolled distribution of TDRs in the transfer district normally
impedes the above mentioned goals of environmental quality of life
and small town character. For example, there is nothing to prevent
the accumulation of development rights by a single property owner
and the erection of a structure that is completely out of character with
the surrounding area.216 No court has accorded a harshly regulated
landowner's TDR options-in and of themselves-the status of a rea-
sonable beneficial use of land. French held to the contrary, and Penn
Central did not disturb this conclusion. While preservation accom-
panied by TDR in either urban or suburban and rural communities
may avoid taking consequences, the TDR device may itself have such
arbitrary planning consequences for a municipality that great caution
should be exercised prior to its use as a means of protecting natural
resources.
2. The Uniformity Issue
Optional TDR creates uncertainty as to whether all development
within the transfer district will bear its fair share of a legitimate envi-
214. See note 166 supra.
215. See Construction Indus. Ass'n v. City of Petaluma, 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 934 (1976) (zoning changes to retard rapid growth of
small town are legitimate); Steel Hill Dev., Inc. v. Town of Sanbornton, 469 F.2d 956
(lst Cir. 1972) (increase in minimum lot size for new developments not arbitrary as a
protection against rapid population growth); Golden v. Planning Bd., 30 N.Y.2d 359,
285 N.E.2d 291,334 N.Y.S.2d 138 (1972), appealdismissed, 409 U.S. 1003 (1974) (sub-
division zoning limitations to effect statutorily defined legitimate zoning purposes
such as avoiding population concentration are valid).
216. Costonis, Deyelopment Rights Transfer, supra note 7, at 99.
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ronmental preservation infrastructure burden. Mandatory TDR cou-
pled with harsh restrictions within the preservation zone, on the other
hand, may violate Fourteenth Amendment rights of property own-
ers.
2 17
At the heart of TDR is the transfer of permissible densities from
the preservation district to a pre-designated receiving lot area.
218
Past legal challenges to this kind of density zoning have arisen largely
in the context of PUDs and cluster zoning cases.219 In hearing such
cases, most courts have held that the regulations pass the uniformity
test if they allow all property owners within the zoning district "to
develop their parcels in accordance with the flexible density, building
type, or use requirements of these ordinances. ' 220 To the extent that
TDR compares with PUDs and cluster zoning techniques, it is justifi-
able under an expanded version of the Eiclidean police power ra-
tionale, ie., that land use classifications and restrictions within a
specific district are valid where necessary to further a "substantial
public purpose" 221 such as preserving open space. Conventional zon-
ing and TDR differ, however, in two important aspects.
First, TDR permits increased development only for those who
purchase development rights; and second, there is a limited sup-
ply of development rights. If some owners decide not to sell
their rights, there will be even fewer rights available. This may
preclude interested landowners from participating in the pro-
gram.2
22
TDR restrictions may appear uniform on their face, but in applica-
tion the results can often be uneven. For example, although all pres-
ervation property owners are restricted in the use of their land, under
the TDR model employed here it is far from certain that each land-
217. See, e.g., Fred F. French Inv. Co. v. City of New York, 39 N.Y.2d 587, 350
N.E.2d 381, 385 N.Y.S.2d 5 (1976), appeal dismissed, 429 U.S. 990 (1976).
218. See Rose, supra note 20, at 485.
219. See notes 22-24 and accompanying text supra. See also Orinda Homeowners
Comm. v. Board of Supervisors, 11 Cal. App. 3d 768, 90 Cal. Rptr. 88 (1970) (cluster
development); Chrinko v. South Brunswick Township Planning Bd., 77 N.J. Super.
594, 187 A.2d 221 (Super. Ct. Law Div. 1963) (cluster zoning valid on public policy
grounds, only incidentally benefited subdivision developer); Cheney v. Village 2 at
New Hope, Inc., 429 Pa. 626, 241 A.2d 81 (1968) (PUD district replacing earlier zon-
ing plan valid).
220. Costonis, The Chicago Plan, supra note 56, at 623-24, THE TRANSFER OF
DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS, at 313-14.
221. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 127 (1978).
222. Carlo & Wright, supra note 24, at 14.
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owner will be able to sell his development rights, let alone command
a price approximating "fair market value." Since the sale of develop-
ment rights depends on the demand to build at increased densities in
the transfer district, if this demand is lacking or diminishes after a
time, landowners who have yet to sell their development rights may
miss the opportunity to mitigate their financial loss.223 The demand
for development rights is part of an "unpredictable real estate mar-
ket" '224 beyond the control of most landowners. Although a basic
premise of TDR is that a sense of fairness dictates that preservation
property owners receive some compensation for the public benefit
they are providing,225 the transfer mechanism apparently results in
fortuitous non-uniform treatment of similarly situated preservation
properties.
Regulations within a transfer district also lack uniformity since
"purchasers of development rights can build to greater densities than
other property owners in the district.""2 6 Nevertheless, with the ex-
ception of certain spot zoning problems,227 the opportunity of proper-
ties located within the receiving lot area to acquire development
rights gives affected landowners in the district equal protection under
the law. Although the costs to transfer district property owners of
purchasing development rights to build at increased densities are not
insubstantial, presumably under incentive zoning theory the benefit
to the transfer district landowner outweighs the financial burdens in-
curred by participation in the program. 8 After all, no one forces
223. Field & Conrad, supra note 53, at 338.
224. Fred F. French Inv. Co. v. City of New York, 39 N.Y.2d 587, 598, 350
N.E.2d 381, 388, 385 N.Y.S.2d 5, 12 (1976).
225. Costonis, "Fair" Compensation and the Accommodation Power: Antidotesfor
the Taking Impasse in Land Use Controversies, 75 COL. L. REV. 1021, 1062 (1975).
226. Costonis, The Chicago Plan, supra note 56, at 621, THE TRANSFER OF DE-
VELOPMENT RIGHTS, at 312. In this way, "developers would be disproportionately
burdened when compared to developers in other parts of the city able to secure rezon-
ings, variances, or other public largesse to achieve the same densities." Gale, supra
note 51, at 87. "Though the expenses associated with this procedure in legal fees and
lost construction time are not usually inconsequential, it is likely that they will not
often equal the cost of purchasing development rights in an open market." Id at 87
n.35. Consequently, "the relevant inquiry [should] be whether all landowners within
the transfer district enjoy equal access to the development rights that are for sale there
and not whether some landowners in the district will ultimately build to greater densi-
ties than others by virtue of the program." Costonis, Development Rights Transfer,
supra note 7, at 120.
227. See notes 251-53 and accompanying text infra.
228. Elliott & Marcus, supra note 29, at 61.
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him to buy these rights; he can still develop the transfer site to its
existing zoning limits "without any costs other than those associated
with the purchase and development of comparable property lying in-
side and outside the district. 229 The ability to develop at the densi-
ties originally permitted in the district should provide a developer
with sufficient financial return to offset any claim that he has been
unfairly discriminated against in the event that there are no more
development rights for sale.23°
It cannot be said, however, that the same reasoning applies to the
owner of property located within the preservation district who wishes
to use his own development rights to erect a structure in the transfer
district. Unless he is in the fortuitous position of already owning
land in the receiving lot area, the prospective developer must first go
to the considerable trouble and expense of purchasing a transfer lot
upon which to attach his development rights.23'
Unless a municipality can prove that the restrictions and benefits it
imposes on affected landowners under a preservation plan with TDR
options are reasonably related to the preservation of the municipal-
ity's natural resources, lack of uniform treatment of properties lo-
cated within the preservation and transfer districts makes
questionable the basic fairness of using TDR for this purpose.
3. TDR and its Relation to "A Comprehensive Plan"
In recent years, local governments have adopted increasingly strin-
gent environmental protection measures pursuant to their police
power. Courts have upheld these regulations232 on the theory that
229. Shlaes, supra note 28, at 8, THE TRANSFER OF DEVELOPMENT RIGHT, at 332.
230. For a discussion of the taking issues involved in TDR, see notes 111-24 and
accompanying text supra.
231. Unconstitutionality, supra note 56, at 1111.
232. See, e.g., Steel Hill Dev., Inc. v. Town of Sanbornton, 469 F.2d 956 (lst Cir.
1972); Potomac Sand and Gravel Co. v. Governor of Md., 266 Md. 358, 293 A.2d 241,
(1972) cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1040 (1972). These cases upheld environmental regula-
tions against equal protection claims on the theory that a rational basis existed for the
singling out of developers' property. The decision of the Steel Hill court is indicative
of the lengths to which courts are willing to go in the interests of environmental pro-
tection.
[W]e find little merit to appellant's contentions that the zoning ordinance [mini-
mum 6 acre lot forest conservation zone] has resulted in a taking of appellant's
property without just compensation or that it is discriminatory .... [A]ppellant
still has the land and buildings.... Though the value of the tract has been
decreased considerably, it is not worthless or useless so as to constitute a tak-
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"no property is an economic island, free from contributing to the wel-
fare of the whole of which it is but a dependent part. The limits are
that unfair or disproportionate burdens may not . . . be placed on
single properties or their owners."233 Concepts such as the public
trust doctrine and a rediscovered law of custom have stripped certain
natural areas of any development mirage their owners might have
perceived. According transferable development rights to such areas
arguably ignores these recent harbingers of the law and reverts to an
earlier view that all private property, regardless of uniqueness, is to
be treated alike insofar as laissezfaire development options are con-
cemed.
Any measure which bestows development rights on an environ-
mentally sensitive area presumptively lacks planning credence, unless
this classification can be defended as part of a complex but effective
means of securing environmental preservation--one of the goals of
the plan.
Under traditional zoning theory, any classification of land use is
valid as long as there is a rational basis for imposing the restric-
tion.234 This standard requires a showing that there is a "reasonable
relation between the end sought to be achieved by the regulation and
the means used to achieve that end . . ."' TDR schemes seek to
protect community resources through a system wherein transfer dis-
trict property owners pay for the public benefit preserved in their vi-
cinity in exchange for the right to build at additional, and
presumably more profitable, densities.236 In this regard, the use of
TDR to help protect environmental resources can be said to reflect a
belief that the well-ordered development of a municipality requires
the preservation and enhancement of the area's open space to be bal-
anced by shifted and heightened development densities in other ar-
eas.2 37  TDR should be in accordance with the municipality's
ing .... As to appellan's claim of discrimination, we note that its land, like all
other land zoned six acres, is essentially virgin forest.
469 F.2d at 963.
233. Fred F. French Inv. Co. v. City of New York, 39 N.Y.2d 587, 599, 350
N.E.2d 381, 389, 385 N.Y.S.2d 5, 12 (1976).
234. Elliott & Marcus, supra note 29, at 60.
235. Fred F. French Inv. Co. v. City of New York, 39 N.Y.2d at 596, 350 N.E.2d
at 386, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 10.
236. DeVoy, supra note 45, at 3. See notes 26-27 and accompanying text supra.
237. See, e.g., Steel Hill Dev., Inc. v. Town of Sanbornton, 469 F.2d 956, 961-62
(1st Cir. 1972). This is also the basic premise behind the use of subdivision exactions
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comprehensive plan. In the process, the overall expected density of
the community should not change; rather, a proportion of the density
originally allowed in the preservation zone will move to the receiving
transfer zone. s
It is by no means certain, however, that the use of TDR will ade-
quately protect environmentally sensitive lands.2 39 For example, if
the purpose behind the implementation of such a scheme is to protect
a coastal estuary, but the transfer district is designated adjacent to the
preservation zone, as is often the case, quite possibly the additional
densities in the transfer district may disturb and even preclude the
successful maintenance of a suitable habitat for the area's native flora
and fauna. Similarly, if the intent of a particular TDR plan is to
protect open space while promoting public access to the lands in
question, and if the transfer district is too far from the preservation
area for the additional population to benefit from the open space, the
municipality may not realize its objective.
If the transfer district lies in an area adjacent to the preservation
zone, it seems equitable to have the landowners in the area pay for at
least the aesthetic, if not the economic, windfall they receive by virtue
of their location. As previously discussed, however, the constraints of
the real estate market in the community often necessitate the estab-
lishment of a transfer district at some distance from the preservation
area. If so, it may well be unreasonable to require property owners in
the district to purchase development rights in order to build at in-
creased densities. They receive no aesthetic benefit from the environ-
mental resources they are paying to preserve; the benefits go instead
to the area adjacent to the open space, on which no costs have been
and Special Natural Area Districts. The authority of a municipality is well-grounded
in its power to plan for the general public welfare. See generally Village of Euclid v.
Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
238. Spagna, supra note 63, at 18-19.
239. In one case, TDR produced the following results:
The lands which have been preserved are small parcels. At the present time, they
are isolated from each other and do not meet the goal of preserving essential
resources such as farmlands, wetlands, and recharge areas, which require large
contiguous areas for an effective preservation program. Whether these small
tracts will be integrated into a broader expanse will depend on the continued
attractiveness to builders of the bonus densities in the transfer district. ...
Pizor, Non-Metropolitan Transfer of Development Rights Program: Program Experi-
ence in the Middle Atlantic States 27 (May 3, 1979) (paper prepared for presentation
at the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy Seminar on TDR).
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imposed. 24
Consequently, too much distance between preservation and trans-
fer areas risks losing the "planning connection" between underuse of
one area and overbuilding of the other.24' The result can be "plan-
ning chaos."242 Without the buffer of light and air created by the
preservation zone, the relaxation of bulk and density restrictions in
the transfer district may "overload public services and distort the ur-
ban landscape. 243
This situation arises partly because many TDR schemes fail to ef-
fectively regulate the sale of development rights and their subsequent
distribution in the transfer district. The right to build at additional
densities in an as-of-right TDR scheme (unlike the permit system of
the Special Natural Area District244) is not controlled by any govern-
mental standards except the district's maximum density regulation.245
Thus, nothing may preclude a developer from buying up all the
available development rights and constructing a building with a max-
imum floor area ratio (FAR),' 6 regardless of its effect on surround-
ing properties.247 Hence, a property owner in the transfer district
"may find that his neighbor has built a larger structure than would
otherwise be possible on a nearby site, thereby reducing access to
light, air, and view" 248 and perhaps, as a result, the value of his land.
A landowner in this position may have some means of legal re-
dress. A case in point is Fred F French Investing Co. v. City of New
240. Unconstitutionality, supra note 56, at 1118.
241. Marcus, New York City, supra note 33, at 21.
242. Costonis, The Chicago Plan, supra note 56, at 628, THE TRANSFER OF DE-
VELOPMENT RIGHTS, at 317. The foundation for such a charge lies on the assumption
"that government may fix density levels only on the basis of substantive criteria-
those relating to adequate light, air, pedestrian access, and similar factors." Costonis,
Development Rights Transfer, supra note 7, at 103.
243. Costonis, The Chicago Plan, supra note 56, at 628, THE TRANSFER OF DE-
VELOPMENT RIGHTS, at 317.
244. For discussion of principles underlying special natural area zoning districts,
see notes 104-10 and accompanying text supra.
245. Costonis, Development Rights Transfer, supra note 7, at 89.
246. Floor area ratio is a concept used to control the amount of building on a lot.
The FAR "number" represents the multiple of the lot area which produces the allow-
able maximum floor area development, under the existing zoning ordinance.
247. Field and Conrad, supra note 53, at 338.
248. Shlaes, supra note 28, at 9, THE TRANSFER OF DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS, at
334-35.
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York. 249 Therein the New York Supreme Court noted the failure to
give adequate notice to the designated receiving area landowners of
the expected increases in bulk and density as one of its grounds for
declaring the ordinance unconstitutional.
250
These facts may also provide the basis for a claim that TDR effects
an invalid "spot zoning" of sites within the transfer district. Spot
zoning has been defined as the "reclassification of a small area of
land in such a manner as.to disturb the tenor of the surrounding
neighborhood."'251 The result is that the owner of the site in question
benefits from the reclassification to the detriment of other property
owners in the area. 52 Spot zoning challenges can be overcome only
upon a showing that the special treatment accorded the landowner
involved is reasonably necessary to further the efforts of the munici-
pality in implementing its comprehensive plan.
25 3
In considering the viability of such a claim in the present context, it
is important to remember the purpose of TDR: to distribute the ben-
efits and burdens involved in the protection of environmentally sensi-
tive lands throughout the entire community, and to avoid singling out
preservation property owners to bear the full cost of protecting the
area's natural resources.2 54 In the process, the transfer district as a
whole should benefit from the additional densities available to prop-
erty owners who wish to build with development rights.2 55 With no
control mechanism, save the "unpredictable real estate market,"
256
by which to regulate the distribution of development rights through-
out the transfer district, there can be no assurance that area property
owners will benefit from new development.257 Nor is it certain that
any new development in the transfer district will actually pay for the
249. 77 Misc. 2d 199, 352 N.Y.S.2d 762 (Sup. Ct. 1973).
250. Id at 205, 352 N.Y.S.2d at 768.
251. Pierrepont v. Zoning Comm'n, 154 Conn. 463, 469, 226 A.2d 659, 662 (1967).
252. Carlo & Wright, supra note 24, at 16.
253. See generally Haar, supra note 30.
254. Costonis, Development Rights Transfer, supra note 7, at 99. See generally
notes 48-50 and accompanying text supra.
255. See Schlaes, supra note 28, at 8, THE TRANSFER OF DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS,
at 334.
256. Fred F. French Inv. Co. v. City of New York, 39 N.Y.2d 587, 598, 350
N.E.2d 381, 388, 385 N.Y.S.2d 5, 12 (1976).
257. See Shlaes, supra note 28, at 9, THE TRANSFER OF DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS, at
334.
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preservation of the community's natural resources. 25s
Without greater assurance that TDR will effectively protect natural
resources as well as the interests of affected property owners, the as-
sertion that TDR restrictions are "expected to produce a widespread
public benefit" '259 may be insufficient to overcome an attack on the
ordinance as an arbitrary and therefore impermissible exercise of
municipal power. At present, no practical proposals to guide the
"unpredictable real estate market 26° have emerged to ensure the
uniform treatment of all similarly situated properties. Nor have con-
trols been implemented that effectively regulate the sale and distribu-
tion of development rights within the transfer district so that the
dispersal of the additional densities from the preservation zone will
minimize adverse impact on the immediate surrounding area. With-
out such controls, a TDR scheme may be found not to accord with a
comprehensive plan.
Indeed, recognition of development rights in natural area proper-
ties for transfer elsewhere risks challenge of such rights as discordant
with the comprehensive plan. Where marshes or coastlines are eligi-
ble for preservation under custom or public trust doctrines and dis-
tinct investment-backed expectations are limited to shellfishing and
rice culture, TDR seems more like overkill than a reasonable means
of achieving environmental preservation in accordance with a com-
prehensive plan. Consequently, unless it can be shown that no more
reasonable or less restrictive planning tool exists with which to pro-
tect our natural resources, a court may declare the use of TDR in this
context arbitrary and invalid.26'
C. The Legality of Subdivision Exactions for Environmental
Preservation
I. The Taking Issue
The author's suggestion advanced herein contemplates, as a condi-
tion precedent to the privilege of subdivision, either the acquisition
and subsequent dedication of an appropriate 62 portion of the envi-
258. See notes 34-42 and accompanying text supra.
259. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 133 n.30 (1978).
260. Fred F. French Inv. Co. v. City of New York, 39 N.Y.2d 587, 598, 350
N.E.2d 381, 388, 385 N.Y.S.2d 5, 12 (1976).
261. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 127 (1978).
262. The subdivision legislation would contain an appropriate ratio based on land
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ronmental reserve or payment of a fee in lieu thereof to the munici-
pality. Such subdivision fees would reimburse the municipality for
its acquisition of the environmental reserve.263 Following reimburse-
ment such fees could help meet environmental reserve maintenance
needs.
The basis of any claim brought by a developer that a given subdi-
vision exaction regulation results in an invalid taking for public use
will generally rest on either or both of two arguments. First, the
property which he is being requested to dedicate "subtracts from the
land available for development" to such an unreasonable extent that
it will substantially interfere with his right to make a "reasonable
return" on investment.z 4 Second, subdivision fees which are not
passed on to homebuyers in the subdivision are an inequitable charge
against his profits. 26
5
In the past, the validity of subdivision exactions has been upheld
against taking claims on the theory that the authority to subdivide
vacant land is in fact a privilege,266 granted to the developer at the
diicretion of a municipality. Since nothing compels a property owner
to subdivide his land, it is not unreasonable to expect him to fulfill
certain requirements which the local government views as necessary
to protect the public welfare.267 Although the privilege rationale has
apparently lost its vitality in federal courts,268 it still forms the basis
values in the environmental reserve and the number of units contemplated in the
subdivision.
263. A similar approach was proposed in New York City as a means of reimburs-
ing the city's costs in acquiring land for a low-income housing project. The proposal
would have relocated those deprived of housing by raising zoning densities in an area
ripe for market-rate high-rise housing. The beneficiaries of the rezoning would have
paid pro rata fees to the city for this purpose. See Elliott & Marcus, supra note 29, at
69-72.
264. MANDELKER & CUNNINGHAM, supra note 18, at 810.
265. Id
266. Jacobsen & McHenry, Exactions on Development Permission, in WINDFALLS
FOR WIn'otrrs 342, 345 (D. Hagman & D. Misczynski eds. 1978).
Local governments first imposed conditions on developers in exchange for re-
cording a subdivision plat map. Local governments justified this control with the
rationale that recording a subdivision plat map was a privilege so that convey-
ances could be made by reference to the plat instead of by cumbersome metes
and bounds descriptions. Since it was not a right, the privilege could be condi-
tioned.
Id
267. MANDELKER & CUNNINGHAM, supra note 18, at 810.
268. Id
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for many state court decisions upholding the validity of various sub-
division land use controls.269
Additional justification for the exaction of land and money from
developers comes from the growing recognition of the importance of
protecting the community's environmentally sensitive lands.27 0 Fur-
thermore, exaction requirements should not be regarded as unduly
burdening the ability of a landowner to make use of his property.
The municipality by approval of a proposed subdivision plat en-
ables the subdivider to profit financially by selling the subdivi-
sion lots as home building sites and thus realize a greater price
than could have been obtained if he had sold his property as
unplatted lands. In return for this benefit, the municipality may
require him to dedicate part of his platted land to meet a de-
mand to which the municipality would not have been put but for
the influx of people into the community to occupy the subdivi-
sion lots.271
Consequently, land dedication and fee exaction requirements are re-
garded as a reasonable regulation of the right to build. These re-
quirements protect the overriding general public interest in securing
appropriate growth absorption safeguards, including the preservation
of open space and other natural resources in the community.272
Courts have not hesitated, however, to invalidate the use of exac-
tion requirements upon a finding that the dedication or per lot fee
resulted in a substantial depreciation in the value of the developer's
property, either in actual acreage or marketability. For example, in
East Neck Estates, Ltd Y. Luchsinger,273 the New York Supreme
Court held confiscatory a requirement that a property owner dedicate
a strip of shore front for use as a public beach when the loss of the
land, which the owner conceded was not suitable for home construc-
tion, would decrease the value of the tract by more than a third.274 In
269. See generally Mid-Continent Builders, Inc. v. Mid-West City, 539 P.2d 1377,
1379 (Okla. 1975) (requirement that developers install water lines not a taking); Jor-
dan v. Village of Menomonee Falls, 28 Wis. 2d 608, 618-19, 137 N.W.2d 442, 448
(1965) (required dedication of land for park, school or recreational sites as condition
for subdivision approval a valid exercise of police power).
270. See notes 134-50 and accompanying text supra.
271. Jordan v. Village of Menomonee Falls, 28 Wis. 2d 608, 618-19, 137 N.W.2d
442, 448 (1965).
272. See note 132 and accompanying text supra.
273. 61 Misc. 2d 619, 305 N.Y.S.2d 922 (Sup. Ct. 1969).
274. Id at 623, 305 N.Y.S.2d at 926. The court went so far as to sanction munici-
pal dictation of park designation on an official map, which would preclude any devel-
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so doing, the court recognized that the value of a parcel of land de-
rives as much from its location as from the amount of property avail-
able for development. 75 Thus, while it might be reasonable to
require one developer to dedicate a certain percentage of land for
public use, the same requirement applied to another parcel of similar
size could prove inequitable given the intangible elements of value
inherent in property ownership.276
This author's suggested device avoids the East Neck Estates prob-
lem of on-site dedication since land dedication requirements could be
satisfied off the subdivision site in accordance with stated environ-
mental reserve acquisition priorities. Because the subdivider cannot
force the city to condemn its property, in lieu fees will always be a
necessary backup device.
As the court implied in East Neck Estates, the concept of exacting
per lot fees developed to avoid inequities peculiar to the subdivision
property.277 By paying a per lot fee instead of dedicating land, a de-
veloper might be able to use all the land available to him for subdivi-
sion purposes while still paying his proportionate share of the cost of
protecting the remaining vacant land in the community. 78 Absent a
deprivation of reasonable use of property, a court would not find an
invalid taking.
Cases such as East Neck Estates, as well as other decisions uphold-
ing the use of subdivision exactions to provide community open
space, also attest to the growing consensus that proximity to open
space actually enhances the value of subdivided land.2 79 Given that
opment within the area. It drew the line at dedication. From the standpoint of
environmental preservation the result is satisfactory; from the standpoint of public
uses, the result is unsatisfactory.
275. Id
276. See generally note 280 infra.
277. East Neck Estates, Ltd. v. Luchsinger, 61 Misc. 2d at 621-22, 305 N.Y.S.2d at
924-25.
278. Id
279. See generaly Associated Home Builders v. City of Walnut Creek, 4 Cal. 3d
633, 484 P.2d 606, 94 Cal. Rptr. 630 (1971), appeal dismissed, 404 U.S. 878 (1971)
(park land dedication or fee payment in lieu thereof as condition precedent to subdi-
vision approval valid on public need grounds, not a taking); Jenad, Inc. v. Village of
Scarsdale, 18 N.Y.2d 78, 218 N.E.2d 673, 271 N.Y.S.2d 955 (1966) (fee payment in
lieu of land dedication by developer upheld where statute allowed village to require
appropriate conditions as prerequisite to subdivision approval); East Neck Estates,
Ltd. v. Luchsinger, 61 Misc. 2d 619, 305 N.Y.S.2d 922 (Sup. Ct. 1969) (required dedi-
cation of shoreland as public park valid exercise of police power as prerequisite to
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this increase in value will more than likely be reflected in the price
eventually set for the subdivided lots,28 ° the fees, or for that matter,
the land dedications, should not be regarded as "an unreasonable"
charge against developers' profits.28" ' If the additional costs develop-
ers incur in meeting the exaction requirements are ultimately passed
on to consumers, and the builders' margin of profit thereby remains
the same282 as it would have been had the exaction not been imposed,
there should no longer be grounds on which to base a due pro-
cess/taking objection.283
subdivision approval); Jordan v. Village of Menomonee Falls, 28 Wis. 2d 608, 137
N.W.2d 442 (1965) (fee payment prerequisite to valid exercise of police power). In
East Neck Estates, however, the court noted:
It was testified that the value of a shorefront lot on the tract was well over
$20,000. A person who is willing and who can pay this sum for a building plot
and erect upon it a suitable home is rarely enamored of the prospect of viewing
the public between his living room and the panorama of Long Island Sound.
Whatever the sociological import of such an attitude be, it is a fact that it reduces
the value of shorefront property, and in this case by over a third. The question is
not whether this is fair, sensible, or patriotic, the question is whether such [pub-
lic] ownership would cause this result.
61 Misc. 2d at 623, 305 N.Y.S.2d at 926.
280. Dedications, supra note 92, at 421-30. The method of analysis used by the
authors of this note was derived from the "before and after" rule of eminent domain
used in California, among other jurisdictions. Id at 421 n.10.
In California, eminent domain law guarantees that the developer will always be
paid, as a minimum the 'fair market value' of the condemned property. In addi-
tion, the developer receives any indirect economic benefits deriving from the con-
demnation and subsequent development of the surrounding property....
Id at 420.
In 'before and after' rule jurisdictions, the first step in compensating a property
owner is to determine the precondemnation value of the entire piece of property.
The value remaining after condemnation is then determined. The condemnee is
paid the difference between the fair market value of the entire parcel prior to
condemnation and the value of the remnant after condemnation.
Id at 421 n.10.
In a jurisdiction that adheres to the 'before and after' rule of eminent domain
compensation, the municipality will not be required to pay the developer the
value of condemned land if he is indirectly compensated by the residents of the
subdivision.
Id at 429 n.25.
281. Id at 421-30.
282. Id
283. Id. at 423-24. See also Associated Home Builders v. City of Walnut Creek, 4
Cal. 3d 633, 640 n.6, 484 P.2d 606, 612 n.6, 94 Cal. Rptr. 630, 636 n.6 (1971) appeal
dismissed, 404 U.S. 878 (1971); Aunt Hack Ridge Estates v. Planning Comm'n, 160
Conn. 109, 118-19, 273 A.2d 880, 885 (1970).
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Even without resorting to an analysis of the supply and demand
curve reflected in the sale of subdivided lots in areas containing envi-
ronmentally sensitive lands, courts are unlikely to find that subdivi-
sion exactions effect an invalid taking of private property. The
protection of natural resources has judicial recognition as a valid po-
lice power objective, paramount to the interests of private property
owners in realizing a profit from their investment.28 4 At the same
time, subdivision exactions do not deprive a landowner of all reason-
able use of his property. He is merely required to assume his propor-
tionate share of the cost of preserving the remaining environmental
resources in the area.285 It is to his benefit to do so. Consequently, as
long as the amount of land or money exacted from a developer is not
excessive and he is given adequate notice of the cost so that it may be
included in his initial price projections, 28 6 it cannot be said that sub-
division exactions result in a taking of private property for public use,
contrary to due process.
2. The Reasonableness of Exactions
a. The Reasonable Relationsh v Test
Can the exactions be premised on benefit to the community at
large or must the benefit be uniquely attributable to the "contribut-
ing" subdivision?
The use of subdivision exactions to protect valuable vacant land
has usually been regarded as a legitimate exercise of the municipal-
ity's authority to plan for the general welfare of the community.
287
284. See notes 132-40 and accompanying text supra. Reliance on the police
power to uphold subdivision exactions reflects the decision of the courts in this coun-
try to:
place greater emphasis on the community-wide benefits resulting from the exac-
tions than on those accruing to the particular subdivision. This shift [also] re-
flects the courts' appreciation of the practical difficulties that large-scale
development poses for local governments and their willingness to favor the latter
in the trade-off between developer profits and sound community growth. Thus,
the improvement need not be located within or contiguous to the subdivision as
long as its benefits are available to subdivision residents. It may benefit the re-
mainder of the community, as well as these residents, provided that the subdivi-
sion is a contributing factor to the need for the facility.
Costonis, Develonpment Rights Transfer, supra note 7, at 112-13.
285. See notes 69-75 and accompanying text supra.
286. See Johnston, Constitutionality of Subdivision Exactions: The Questfor a Ra-
tionale, 52 CORNELL L.Q. 871, 922 (1967).
287. See note 69 supra.
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The power of a local government to enact such measures derives
from a state's version of the Standard City Planning Act.288 That Act
"obligates commissions to adopt a master plan for the physical devel-
opment of the municipality," ' 9 and authorizes local planning boards
to promulgate subdivision regulations which condition plat approval
on the provision of adequate facilities for open space, light, and air to
benefit community residents?2" All subdivision exactions can be
thought of as "grounded upon a judgment that subdivisions which do
not provide adequate space. . . for parks and other public uses are
defective." '291 According to one commentator, exactions are neces-
sary to protect consumers who "may be able to discern the existence
of such defects, [but whose] bargaining power is probably too weak to
force subdividers to provide necessary improvements. '2 1z This view
gains support through recent judicial decisions upholding environ-
mental protection measures on the theory that the public's interest in
the preservation of natural resources outweighs a developer's right to
build on his property.293 The courts have also indicated that a mu-
nicipality may have an affirmative duty to establish nature preserves
in the interest of the public health and welfare given "the inexorable
decrease in open space available to fulfill such a need. '"94
Any attempt to exercise the police power, however, is subject to a
test of reasonableness.2 95 In evaluating a particular subdivision ordi-
nance against this standard, a court must consider whether the means
selected by the municipality will indeed serve to implement the pol-
icy objective of preserving environmentally sensitive lands, and
whether the exaction requirements are being applied to developers in
a uniform manner.
The most common justification for subdivision exactions is that de-
velopers should pay to replace or preserve the proportion of open
288. UNITED STATES DEP'T OF COMMERCE, A STANDARD CITY PLANNING EN-
ABLING ACT (1928).
289. Id § 6.
290. Id § 14.
291. Johnston, supra note 286, at 923.
292. Id
293. See notes 69 and 185 supra.
294. Associated Home Builders v. City of Walnut Creek, 4 Cal. 3d 633, 638, 484
P.2d 606, 610, 94 Cal. Rptr. 630, 634 (1971).
295. Jordan v. Village of Menomonee Falls, 28 Wis. 2d 608, 619, 137 N.W.2d 442,
448 (1965).
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space to be lost to the community from the construction of their pro-
posed subdivision developments.296
The local planning board often determines the amount of land or
fees required from a developer on a case by case basis.297 Except
when a municipality enacts a regulation fixing the land or fee exac-
tion at an arbitrary figure,29 8 or when a showing has otherwise been
made that the board clearly abused its discretionary power,299 courts
will not upset a municipality's determination as to the amount it
should exact from a developer. On the other hand, questions have
arisen in regard to the municipality's ultimate use of the land and
fees exacted.
Contentions concerning the validity of subdivision conditions usu-
ally center on whether a municipality can exact fees or land dedica-
tions from developers to benefit the community as a whole, or only to
meet the need for open space "specifically and uniquely attributa-
ble"3° to a particular subdivision. In most cases invalidating plat
approval conditions, the courts have adopted the latter approach.
Given today's growing concern for comprehensive environmental
planning in the face of diminishing open space, the "specifically and
uniquely attributable" approach seems ill-equipped to deal with the
need for well-coordinated community development.
When applied, the ["specifically and uniquely attributable"]
doctrine usually prevents suburbs from collecting cash contribu-
tions for city-wide programs. . . . In other critical situations,
296. See notes 69-70 and accompanying text supra.
297. ANDERSON, supra note 23, at § 23.19.
298. Admiral Dev. Corp. v. Maitland, 267 So. 2d 860 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977)
(ordinance requiring five percent of subdivided area to be dedicated as park or, if area
dedicated is too small for park, a fee of five percent of gross area value as prerequisite
to subdivision approval held overbroad and invalid); Frank Ansuini, Inc. v. City of
Cranston, 107 R.I. 63, 264 A.2d 910 (1970) (required dedication of seven percent of
subdivision land for parks arbitrary).
299. Admiral Dev. Corp. v. Maitland, 267 So. 2d 860 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977)
(arbitrary five percent of gross area value fee in lieu of park land dedication an abuse
of discretion); Gordon v. Village of Wayne, 370 Mich. 329, 121 N.W.2d 823 (1963)
(town has no authority to compel park dedication or fees in lieu thereof prior to plat
approval); Haugen v. Gleason, 226 Or. 99, 359 P.2d 108 (1961) (planning regulation
authorizing exaction of land acquisition fee from developers as prequisite to subdivi-
sion approval invalid absent limitations assuring fees would go to directly benefit a
regulated subdivision).
300. Pioneer Trust and Sav. Bank v. Village of Mount Prospect, 22 Ill. 2d 375,
381, 176 N.E.2d 799, 802 (1961). See also Aunt Hack Ridge Estates, Inc. v. Planning
Comm'n, 160 Conn. 109, 273 A.2d 880 (1970).
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[it] provides no protection at all. For example, the doctrine liter-
ally would authorize the exaction of fire engines, library books,
and teachers' salaries whenever a development is large enough
to have created the entire "need" for those expenditures. 30
1
This approach is particularly ineffective when applied to the prob-
lem of how best to protect a community's natural resources. The
need for early municipal action to preserve environmentally sensitive
lands precludes continuing an approach that uses subdivision exac-
tions merely to enhance the beauty and economic value of an indi-
vidual development. Furthermore, there simply may not be enough
vacant land available in a small subdivision to allow it to have its
own park or nature preserve. 30 2 Nor is it certain that preserving such
slivers of open space will adequately protect the ecological balance of
these areas.30 3 Clearly a local government needs the authority to ap-
ply land dedications and fee exactions toward the establishment of
community-wide facilities. This power is essential in maintaining an
area's natural resources.
Recent trends in judicial interpretation of subdivision regulations
indicate that the courts may be willing to validate the use of these
requirements to meet the needs of the municipality as a whole." °
Courts have traditionally considered off-site conditions in determin-
ing the need for subdivision exactions when "the impact of the pro-
posed development on adjacent territory and [other] property within
its jurisdiction ' 35 is found to be a material factor in the promotion of
the general public welfare. 30 6 As courts realize that problems in-
301. Eilickson, supra note 92, at 482.
302. See. e.g., N.Y. Op. State Comp. 78-310.
303. See note 239 supra.
304. See general, Associated Home Builders v. City of Walnut Creek, 4 Cal. 3d
633, 484 P.2d 606, 94 Cal. Rptr. 630 (1971), appeal dismissed, 404 U.S. 878 (1971)
(subdivider seeking to acquire advantages of a subdivision has duty to conform subdi-
vision to the welfare of lot owners and general public); Jenad, Inc. v. Village of Scar-
sdale. 18 N.Y.2d 78, 218 N.E.2d 673, 271 N.Y.S.2d 955 (1966) (where park not
needed, fee in lieu of park land may be exacted, and such fees may be pooled for later
park development to benefit general public).
305. Pearson Kent Corp. v. Bear, 28 N.Y.2d 396, 398, 271 N.E.2d 218, 219 (1971).
306. Id See also Ayers v. Council of Los Angeles, 34 Cal. 2d 31, 207 P.2d 1
(1949) (off-site conditions reasonable to consider in context of subdivision's effect on
local and neighborhood planning and traffic conditions); Land/Vest Properties, Inc.
v. Town of Plainfield, 117 N.H. 817, 379 A.2d 200 (1977) (developer must upgrade
off-site roads leading into subdivision in relation to needs created by and benefits
conferred on subdivision); Garipay v. Town of Hanover, 116 N.H. 34, 351 A.2d 64
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volved in maintaining adequate open space in a particular commu-
nity require a broad reading of a municipality's police power; an
increasing number of jurisdictions are adopting the "reasonable rela-
tionship test" articulated in Jordan v. Village of Menomonee Falls.3" 7
In that case, the Wisconsin court ruled that a municipality need only
show that the demand for additional park and recreation facilities to
be financed by subdivision exactions was "reasonably related" to new
development in the area.3" 8 The court found that this approach was
necessary to avoid imposing "an unreasonable burden of proof upon
the municipality."30 9
The analysis of the Jordan court applies to the use of the subdivi-
sion process urged in this article. If validation of subdivision require-
ments under the reasonable relationship test demands only a showing
that the need for open space is attributable to development activity in
general, then a municipality may use exactions to establish and main-
tain a preserve of environmentally sensitive land. to benefit the com-
munity as a whole.
Local planning boards must be given sufficient flexibility and scope
of authority if this objective is to be achieved. In New York, for in-
stance, "a town planning board may require a subdivision to set aside
a combination of park lands and moneys, to be paid to the town, in
trust, to be used exclusively for recreation purposes, if it determines
that such a combination would most effectively carry out the [town's
plan]." 31 0 Other possible planning devices include developer dedica-
tion or purchase of a separate parcel of land for community use, or a
land swap program. Under such a program in the South Richmond
Special Zoning District in New York City, a developer receives a
(1976) (town planning board may deny subdivision approval solely on basis of inade-
quacy of off-site, town-oriented road).
307. 28 Wis. 2d 608, 137 N.W.2d 442 (1965).
308. Id at 618, 137 N.W.2d at 448.
309. Id at 617-18, 137 N.W.2d at 447.
In most instances it would be impossible for the municipality to prove that the
land required to be dedicated for a park ... was to meet a need solely attributa-
ble to the anticipated influx of people into the community to occupy this particu-
lar subdivision. On the other hand, the municipality might well be able to
establish that a group of subdivisions approved over a period of several years had
been responsible for bringing into the community a considerable number of peo-
ple making it necessary that the land dedications required of the subdividers be
utilized for. . . park and recreational purposes for the benefit of such influx.
Id
310. N.Y. Op. State Comp. 77-447.
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buildable parcel of city-owned property in return for the dedication
of a portion, or even all, of land containing important natural fea-
tures. 3 ''
Care must be taken that the means municipalities use to determine
the amount of the land dedication or fee exaction reflect the propor-
tionate burden placed on the remaining vacant land by the new sub-
division. The regulations should specify maximum and minimum
limits on the percentage of required land or moneys to provide the
planning boards with adequate guidelines for making their determi-
nations, and to give developers sufficient notice of the costs of plat
approval.312 If a municipality enacts these procedural safeguards in
a subdivision ordinance, the reasonableness of the exaction require-
ments should not be in doubt, provided the city applies them in a
consistent manner to all new developments.
b. Uniformity
The issue here is whether new developers and community residents
are being forced to assume a disproportionate burden of the costs of
preserving open space.313 As long as a municipality uses a standard
formula314 to determine the amount all new developers owe to offset
the decrease in available community land caused by the new subdivi-
sion,315 the courts will not invalidate exaction requirements as being
arbitrarily applied to an individual landowner.316 Unless it finds a
311. NEW YORK CITY ZONING RESOLUTION ch. 5, art. X, § 105 (1974). This zon-
ing enactment contains a designated open space network based on the area's largely
intact bountiful topography, forests, and fenways. Affected private land as well as
city-owned parcels are restricted against development.
312. Haugen v. Gleason, 226 Or. 99, 359 P.2d 108 (1961).
313. Fonoroff, Special Districts. 4 Departure from the Concept of Unform Con-
trols, in THE NEW ZONING: LEGAL, ADMINISTRATIVE, AND ECONOMIC CONCEPTS
AND TECHNIQUES 82, 90 (N. Marcus & M. Groves eds. 1970).
314. See generally Heyman & Gilhool, supra note 8, at 1144-47, wherein the au-
thors suggest that the techniques of cost-accounting analysis might prove useful in
this regard.
315. Id at 1134.
316. But see Brown v. City of Joliet, 108 11. App. 2d 230, 247 N.E.2d 47 (1969)
(no other subdividers had been required to install storm drain trunklines); Divan
Builders, Inc. v. Planning Bd., 66 N.J. 582, 334 A.2d 30 (1975) (only two of many
benefited landowners would be charged for drainage facility); McKain v. Toledo City
Planning Comm'n, 26 Ohio App. 2d 171, 270 N.E.2d 370 (1971) (plaintiff had been
required to dedicate land for street widening and adjacent subdivider had not); Frank
Ansuini, Inc. v. City of Cranston, 107 R.I. 63, 264 A.2d 910 (1970) (exaction ordi-
nance arbitrary on its face).
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rational basis for imposing the requirements on new developers
alone, a court might find that a subdivision ordinance discriminates
against new residents generally in favor of older developments and
industrial and commercial property owners whose land was not sub-
ject to similar requirements.317
An analogous situation arises when user fees are required from
new developments in return for connection to the municipal capital
improvements system. In Contractors and Builders Association v. City
of Dunedin,318 the Supreme Court of Florida invalidated an ordi-
nance allowing the city to exact user fees from new developers to
cover the entire cost of expansion of municipal sewer services that
was to be utilized by both old and new residents.319
The court based its decision on the grounds that
it is not just and equitable for a municipally-owned utility to
impose the entire burden of capital expenditures, including re-
placement of an existing plant, on persons connecting to a water
and sewer system after an arbitrarily chosen time certain. The
cost of new facilities should be borne by new users to the extent
new use requires new facilities, but only to that extent.320
If it were otherwise, there would be no rational basis for distinguish-
ing between old and new residents.
In the context of our parks and schools example, the courts have
generally found population to be an acceptable variable on which to
uphold the validity of subdivision exaction requirements. 321 In so
doing, the courts have held that a rational basis exists for imposing
the exactions since the influx of new residents into the community
will generate the need for additional facilities.322 New industrial and
commercial property owners need not share the cost because it is un-
317. See generally Ellickson, supra note 92, at 481-86.
318. 329 So. 2d 314 (Fla. 1976).
319. Id
320. Id at 320-21.
321. Krughoffv. City of Naperville, 41 IlL. App. 3d 334, 336, 354 N.E.2d 489, 501
(1976). See also Associated Home Builders v. City of Walnut Creek, 4 Cal. 3d 633,
484 P.2d 606, 94 Cal. Rptr. 630 (1971), appeal dismissed, 404 U.S. 878 (1971).
322. Heyman & Gilhool, supra note 8, at 1141. The authority of a local govern-
ment to make these classifications derives from its police power.
Under police power doctrine, the burdened class must be shown to be the class
whose actions have created the evil that the legislature is intending to remedy
(CooLEY, THE LAW OF TAXATION § 268 (4th ed. 1924)) and revenues raised from
the police power impositions must be devoted exclusively to the public objectives
that motivated their adoption. The nexus between development and environ-
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likely they will make use of the new facilities. 23 Nor should exac-
tions be required from other residents since they will probably have
already paid for their schools and parks out of their general property
taxes.324 On the other hand, an argument can be made that new resi-
dents are being required to help finance the maintenance costs of old
parks and schools out of their property taxes. It has been remarked,
however, that "[d]iscrimination can be avoided [even here] . . . by
reducing the amount of the exaction by the discounted amount of the
old school costs to be paid by the property tax on the houses in the
new subdivision. 325
Nonetheless, the aforementioned arguments used to uphold the va-
lidity of subdivision exactions and user fees against the charge of
non-uniform administration may not entirely apply to the problem of
environmental protection. The use of subdivision exactions to pro-
tect a municipality's natural resources could well result in new devel-
opers and community residents being burdened with a
disproportionate share of the costs of preserving environmentally
sensitive lands.3 26 While there may be a rational basis for imposing
special costs on new subdivisions to pay for neighborhood facilities
which older residents have already paid for in some way,3 27 it is
clearly inequitable for new residents to pay for any more than their
proportionate share of improvements that will benefit the community
mental harm should fulfill the ... requirement, especially if its existence ap-
pears as an express legislative finding in the enabling act's preface....
Costonis, Development Rights Transfer, supra note 7, at 107.
323, Krughoffv. City of Naperville, 41 IM. App. 3d 334, 336-37, 354 N.E.2d 489,
501 (1976).
324. Heyman & Gilhool, supra note 8, at 1144.
325. Id
326. Mandelker, Catch 13, supra note 90. This is especially true if the experience
of post-Proposition 13 California, where "the cost of fees and permits for an average
house . . . rocketed to $1,283 from just $43" in San Diego is indicative of future
trends. Sansweet, Catch 13-Calfornians Discover Tax Cut Mania Has a Corollar-
Fee Fever, WALL STREET J., June 1, 1979, at 1 (Midwest Edition).
327. Krughoff v. City of Naperville, 41 11. App. 3d 334, 354 N.E.2d 489 (1976).
Accord, Associated Home Builders v. City of Walnut Creek, 4 Cal. 3d 633, 484 P.2d
606, 94 Cal. Rptr. 630 (1971), appeal dismissed, 404 U.S. 878 (1971); Collis v. City of
Bloomington, 310 Minn. 5,246 N.W.2d 19 (1976). But see Ellickson, supra note 92, at
485, in which the author argues that subdivision exactions from new developers
would be fair only "if new. . subdivisions were to receive above average park bene-
fits or if the city had previously relied principally on special assessments, special park
districts, or subdivision exactions to raise revenues for park acquisitions."
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as a whole. 32
8
Consequently, a municipality may need to enact a combination of
exaction, dedication, and tax measures which will reach not only de-
velopers but all taxpayers in the town. This approach would generate
capital in both real property and moneys to protect the area's envi-
ronmentally sensitive lands, and would also address Fourteenth
Amendment equal protection concerns. It would necessitate the
adoption by a local government of a broad-reaching scheme designed
to recapture from owners of all the different kinds of property located
within its jurisdiction their share of the cost of protecting natural re-
sources. A municipality might thus require new developers to com-
ply with existing land dedication and fee exaction requirements. At
the same time, the municipality could levy a special assessment tax329
against the prior residents33' and industrial and commercial property
owners331 in proportion to the benefit they will receive from the pres-
328. Heyman & Gilhool, supra note 8, at 1134.
329. Id at 1146-48. Special assessmepts could thus recapture the windfalls accru-
ing to property owners in the area who would presumably benefit from the establish-
ment of a municipal nature preserve in addition to their existing neighborhood
facilities. Special assessments would be especially useful for this purpose because
they are based on the idea that a landowner may be assessed a tax to pay for special
benefits at a rate proportionate to the increase in value attributable to the property
from the improvement in question. Since the concept "embodies no categorical spa-
tial requirement... [tihe distance of property from the improvement does not itself
preclude the legislature from subjecting it to special assessment." Id at 1148.
Neither is the special assessment "bound by state constitutional requirements of uni-
formity and ad valorem taxation or by limitations on the amount of taxation." Id at
1147. See 2 C. ANTIEAU, MUNICIPAL CORPORATION LAW § 14.00 (1963); 14 E. Mc-
QUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CoRPORATIONS § 38.05 (3d ed. 1950); 1 W. PAGE & P. JONES,
TAXATION BY ASSESSMENT § 34 (1909). If this is the case, special assessments might
also provide a solution to the problems municipalities face, subject to state constitu-
tional limitations on the amount of property taxes that a local government may exact.
See generaly Mandelker, Catch 13, supra note 90.
330. This assumes that adequate statutory authority is found, based on cases up-
holding the special assessment of private land to finance park acquisitions. See, e.g.,
Wilson v. Lambert, 168 U.S. 611 (1898); Winnetka Park Dist. v. Hopkins, 371 111. 46,
20 N.E.2d 58 (1939). Cf. State v. City of Topeka, 201 Kan. 729, 443 P.2d 240 (1968)
(state lands subject to assessment for local park). See also Ellickson, supra note 92, at
484 n.305; Volpert, Creation and Maintenance of Open Spaces in Subdivisions. Another
Approach, 12 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 830 (1965).
331. The basic premise behind special assessments is that the cost of community
facilities should be distributed among landowners in the area in proportion to the
actual benefits or burdens received by them. This premise has also been applied to
industrial property owners in the context of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-
7642 (Supp. III 1979).
In areas unable to meet the national air quality standards, the Clean Air Act autho-
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ervation of environmentally sensitive lands.332 The distinction be-
tween different types of property ownership could be justified on the
basis of the overriding public interest in the protection of natural re-
sources.
3 33
Assessments and exactions can effectively reflect proportionate
costs of environmental protection only if the municipality can reason-
ably determine proportionate benefits to residents from a community
nature preserve. One approach to this problem proposed in the con-
text of parks and schools, determines the base cost of new facilities or
community improvements, and then uses a cost-accounting model334
to apportion the costs among individual units.
Whether this type of system could ensure that all property owners
within a municipality bear their share of the costs of environmental
protection remains to be seen. Nevertheless, some means of allocat-
ing responsibility for the preservation of natural resources among all
community residents must be found if new development is not to be
singled out to bear the full burden of environmental protection. The
alternative may well be a politically acceptable but legally vulnerable
exclusionary device unfairly adding to the cost of housing in the com-
munity.
D. Natural Area Zoning. Legal Questions
The critical legal necessities in any zoning scheme for a unique
natural area will be the environmental acceptability of development
(as evidenced by a planning study) and the existence of a reasonable
beneficial use of land in the context of the property owner's distinct
rizes a new industrial or point pollution source to purchase "pollution rights" from
existing sources in the area. 42 U.S.C. § 7503 (Supp. III 1979). Thus new polluters
can pay existing sources to reduce their pollutant emissions to qualify for permit ap-
proval to build a new facility without imposing additional burdens on the region's air
quality. Before the appropriate state planning authority approves an emission offset
plan, the authority must first calculate the net pollution allocation for the area in
question and determine the proportionate distribution of the costs involved in main-
taining such a system. EPA Effluent Limitations Guidelines, 40 C.F.R. § 51 App. S
(1980).
332. See generally Misczynski, Special Assessments, in WINDFALLS FOR
WipEouTs 311 (D. Hagman & D. Misczynski eds. 1978).
333. See notes 69 and 185 supra; SIMKO, supra note 86, at 14. The recognition of
the importance of acting now to preserve our natural resources also underlies the use
of differential tax assessments to protect valuable agricultural land and open space.
See generally Keene, supra note 102.
334. Heyman & Gilhool, supra note 8, at 1143 n.102.
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investment-backed expectations. The United States Supreme Court
suggested these criteria in Agins v. City of Tiburon."' Such an: ap-
proach envisions no TDR or subdivision aids, but essentially man-
dates environmental protection on a "pay as you go" basis.
A careful study of unique characteristics must precede any special
zoning for a natural area.336 The study can assess fragility or resili-
ence in the face of development, and establish resulting thresholds of
environmental impact for different types of development.
If the study reveals a thoroughly fragile environment, the munici-
pality should entertain no illusions about the efficacy of a special nat-
ural area zoning district which permits even a limited degree of
residential development. In this situation, where environmental pres-
ervation assumes paramount political importance, planners should
consider the TDR and subdivision exaction alternatives along with
the law of custom and the public trust doctrine described earlier in
this article.
Zoning which allows development permits in such a fragile area
would seem to fly in the face of the requirement of consistency with a
well-considered plan. It would appear even more questionable in the
light of NEPA-type process mandates requiring consideration of al-
ternatives which are less damaging to the environment. A municipal-
ity should anticipate litigation from environmentalists if it allows
such a situation to develop.
Should the municipality adopt a restrictive alternative-such as
harshly limited use of the natural area coupled with TDR privileges,
335. 100 S. Ct. 2138, 2142 (1980).
336. The City of Tiburon undertook such a study pursuant to California zoning
legislation which mandates a municipal land use plan providing for open space pres-
ervation. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 65560-65570 (Deering Supp. 1980). This legislation
acknoweldges the necessity of preserving open space:
"for the assurance of the continued availability of land for the production of food
and fiber, for the enjoyment of scenic beauty, for recreation and for the use
of natural resources." CAL. GOVT. CODE § 65561(a) (West Supp. 1980); see
Tiburon, Cal. Ordinance No. 124 N.S. § l(f) and (h) (June 28, 1973).
Agins v. City of Tiburon, 100 S. Ct. 2138, 2142, n.7 (1980). The Court noted that the
Tiburon City Council had found
"[ult is in the public interest to avoid unnecessary conversion of open space land
to strictly urban uses, thereby protecting against the resultant adverse impacts,
such as air, noise and water pollution, traffic congestion, destruction of scenic
beauty, disturbance of the ecology and the environment, hazards related to geol-
ogy, fire and flood, and other demonstrated consequences of urban sprawl." Or-
dinance No. 124 N.S. § 1(c).
Agins v. City of Tiburon, 100 S. Ct. 2138, 2142 n.8.
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subdivision exaction beneficiary status, or tax abatement or exemp-
tion-the affected property owner may litigate the taking issue dis-
cussed in the preceding sections of this article. At this point,
interplay among the following factors would seem critical to a deter-
mination of reasonable beneficial use: Prior use of the property; land
price vis-a-vis other properties zoned for the residential density
sought to be developed; and reasonableness of the restrictions, given
the value of compensatory privileges such as TDR, subdivision exac-
tion beneficiary status, and tax abatement or exemption.
Clearly, a history of unspoiled character coupled with public use of
the property suggests application of the public trust doctrine and/or
the law of custom. Any TDR or other privileges which the munici-
pality in its good conscience confers on the owners of such property
should not buttress taking claims.337 The price for such property will
reflect its limited value for private purposes. A land price compara-
ble to that prevailing on residentially zoned property would, on the
other hand, tend to show "distinct investment-backed expectations"
at odds with customary public or restricted usage.
Care is required in transplanting the Supreme Court's reasonable
beneficial use lessons in Penn Central, a case sustaining New York
City's stringent landmark regulations, to rural and suburban natural
area preservation. The basic difference between the two situations is
that reasonable beneficial use is more likely to be associated with pre-
served urban structures than with preserved naked land in the boon-
docks. While the Court favorably regarded TDR privileges of the
landmark owner as a factor mitigating "taking," the existence of a
reasonable beneficial use in the preserved structure (two-story Grand
Terminal in Manhattan's skyscrapered midtown district) formed the
cornerstone of the court's decision.
The easy case for special natural area district zoning is found
where environmental study of the area discloses its compatibility
with development, provided certain construction precautions and de-
sign and density standards are observed. Just such a sophisticated
regulation emerged from Tiburon's open space plan which the
Supreme Court found constitutional in the Agins case.33 8 Of interest
here was the city's relatively broad range of discretion to limit devel-
337. Le., because these privileges evince compensatory intentions, they should not
be deemed evidence of a "taking" in bad conscience, so as to trigger just compensa-
tion requirements under the 14th Amendment.
338. 100 S. Ct. 2138 (1980).
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opment to five-acre minimum lots or to permit up to five times that
density on a building site.339 The exercise of such discretion presum-
ably would depend on the individual site plan, its sensitivity toward
corridors, topography, and general open space objectives. Special
district zoning is valid when, in light of the affected area's unique
aspects, application of the community's otherwise uniform develop-
ment controls would offend its planning goals. Under these circum-
stances, extreme partisans of the environment will have difficulty
blocking development under NEPA-like statutes, and property own-
ers raising tired Fourteenth Amendment "taking" objections (ie.,
their reasonable beneficial use might have been more beneficial) will
also fail. In more than one hundred instances in Staten Island and
Riverdale, no lawsuits by either group have been generated under the
New York City zoning provision.
This view finds further support inAgins,34 0 which involved a chal-
lenge to the constitutionality of a Tiburon municipal zoning ordi-
nance enacted in accordance with the California Open Space Lands
Act.34' The Agins claimed that the enactment of this comprehensive
land use plan, which placed their five-acre plot of undeveloped land
in a low-density (minimum five-acre lot size), open space zone, re-
sulted in a taking of their property for which they were entitled to
compensatory damages under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments.342
In a unanimous opinion which made numerous references to the
Penn Central decision, the Court found that the Tiburon ordinance
on its face did not effect a taking of the Agins' property. Instead, the
low-density zoning classification promoted a legitimate governmental
objective, the protection of open space, without denying the claim-
ants a reasonable beneficial use of their land.343 The Court held that
the use of natural area districts to protect a community from the ill
effects of urbanization was a valid exercise of the city's police
power.344 Fuithermore, the zoning regulation would not impose a
disproportionate burden of the costs of environmental preservation
339. See 100 S. Ct. at 2140.
340. 100 S. Ct. at 2138.
341. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 65560-65570 (Deering Supp. 1980).
342. 100 S. Ct. at 2140.
343. Id at 2141-42.
344. Id at 2142.
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on the affected landowners.345 The City had determined that al-
though the Agins' property had a holding capacity limit for five-acre
development, an increase in capacity up to one acre development
could be granted under the ordinance at the discretion of local plan-
ning officials. Finding the degree of latitude provided by the Tiburon
plan sufficient to protect the claimants' "reasonable investment ex-
pectations, 346 the Court noted that "[a]lthough the ordinances limit
development, they neither prevent the best use of appellants' land
.. . nor extinguish a fundamental attribute of ownership. . .. ""
Despite the strong language in the Agins opinion, it is not certain
whether natural area zoning will remain constitutional as applied to
all cases.3 48 The Agins challenged the open space zoning scheme
even before they applied for permission to develop their property at a
higher density.349 This fact leaves open the possibility that another
landowner in a similar situation might be denied permission to de-
velop his property with such detrimental effects that the Supreme
Court would invalidate the ordinance in question as an impermissi-
ble confiscation of private property without just compensation.
Consequently, if the municipality uses its zoning powers to protect
special natural areas, it must maneuver the ship of state so as to skirt
the twin shoals of Scylla and Charybdis: the principled rock of envi-
ronmental purity and the property owner's hardy right to a reason-
able beneficial use of his land.
CONCLUSION: CHOOSING THE RIGHT ENVIRONMENTAL STRATEGY
The search among environmental land use techniques for an ever-
beneficent Dr. Jekyll without another inseparable Mr. Hyde has not
led to a panacea. Nagging side effects accompany every "cure." In
another and more important sense, however, the differing negative
345. id
346. Id
347. Id
348. An interesting case on the horizon is San Diego Gas and Elec. Co. v. City of
San Diego, 80 Cal. App. 3d 1026, 146 Cal. Rptr. 103 (1978), which raises questions
concerning the validity of natural area zoning as it affects public utilities. The case
has been scheduled for oral argument during the 1980-81 Supreme Court term, 100 S.
Ct, 3008 (1980). At issue will be a decision of the California Court of Appeals which
found that there was a taking of the claimant's property where inclusion of the land in
an open space zone precluded the laying of power lines, as well as other industrial
uses for which the site was exclusively suited. Id
349. 100 S. Ct. at 2141.
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side effects of the three devices examined herein suggest appropriate-
ness (or inappropriateness) in differing geographical and political
contexts.
Dr. Jekyll discovered too late that integrated individuality, warts
and all, is preferable to a schizoid duality of pure components. Mov-
ing from metaphor to land use, I have tried to show that TDR, subdi-
vision exactions, and zoning all have "warts" when applied to the
problem of environmental preservation in suburban and rural areas.
The community that invokes TDR as its preservation solution un-
leashes a higher density genie elsewhere. It may be difficult to rebot-
tle the genie in transfer zones distant from the preserved natural
resource, with irretrievable loss of small town character possibly en-
suing. The community imposing subdivision exactions risks a costly
head tax on newcomers which may exclude diverse population
groups. Even sensitive natural area zoning gives away the environ-
mental game at the outset by allowing development within the sacred
precincts.
All communities differ from each other in one or more aspects, as
do natural areas. A planning process should enable a community to
rationally choose the most appropriate environmental technique.
Thus, the choice between TDR and subdivision exactions would de-
pend on their relative impacts upon other community goals: encour-
agement of diversity through higher density housing versus
reinforcement of small town character. An environmental analysis
should permit assessment of development potential within any natu-
ral area. If the area can tolerate a measure of development without
losing those precious natural attributes which make the area unique,
natural area zoning may be preferable to either the higher density
implications of TDR or the exclusionary tendencies of subdivision
exactions.
The Janus-like quality of regulatory environmental preservation
techniques reflects the inevitable pressures of a complex society on
single "tunnel-vision" goals."' 0 Thus, in a world teeming with pollu-
tion, poverty, and materialistic values, the environmental virtues of
Dr. Jekyll appear unquestionable. But to deny the connection with
Mr. Hyde suggests that one can have one's cake and eat it too; that
environmental preservation has no economic consequences, no social
consequences, no anti-environment consequences elsewhere.
350. See generally Marcus, Clean 4ir in Search of a ComprehensiYe National Plan:
An Urban View, 8 URB. LAW. 307 (1976).
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Only by recognizing these consequences through a rational consid-
eration of alternatives can we avoid hasty and ill-considered legisla-
tion arising from our passionate uncritical embrace of the
environment. Other competing precious principles and goals must
force us to pick and choose the right environmental strategy from
among an increasing array of tempting caskets.
35
'
351. In Shakespeare's The Merchant of Venice, the aspiring jurist Portia sets a test
for her marriage suitors. They must choose correctly from among three caskets---
gold, silver, and lead--to win her heart. For the correct key to Portia's heart, see Act
III, scene 2.
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